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ABSTRACT
Although having a good human resource strategy is essential to any business anywhere, a good HR
strategy is particularly critical for business endeavors in China. Studies for this thesis focus on how
foreign companies in China deal with HR issues at the managerial level. Through interviews and case
studies, I compare and contrast specific HR strategies adopted by a set of different foreign investors in
China. By examining the successful and less successful aspects of these strategies, I hope to enhance
the understanding of managerial HR issues in China, thereby contributing to the overall understanding
of business management in China.
This thesis consists of four chapters. In Chapter One, I discuss how China's economic and social
legacies from the command era have created a unique business environment that poses great
challenges to the management of managerial HR. Relevant social and cultural barriers are examined to
identify their roles in these challenges. I also discuss the options a firm has in recruiting managers in
China, and present a background report on management education in China.
Chapter Two takes a closer look at the managerial HR market from the demand side. It studies three
different managerial HR management models based on three very different strategies. A set of case
reports based on company research and interviews are presented to provide detailed account of the HR
strategies adopted by these firms in different industries. Companies studied in these cases include those
from the United States, Japan, Taiwan and South East Asia.
Chapter Three examines the supply side of the managerial job market in China by studying an
international MBA program initiated by the MIT Sloan School of Management. I compare the
teaching, curricula and administration of the program with those of its American counterparts. I also
describe the challenges and career prospect faced by the Chinese students in the program.
In Chapter Four, I summarize the lessons learned from the cases studied, and make some general and
specific recommendations based on some good practices I have observed. Lastly, I suggest some short-
term and the long-term outlooks for managerial HR in China to conclude this thesis.
Thesis Supervisor: Edward S. Steinfeld
Title: Mitsubishi Career Development Assistant Professor of Management
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Chapter One - Introduction: Managing Managers in China
"The three key things to remember in doing business in the mainland are
people, people and people."
- Tim Healy, Asiaweek
To many firms in China, having enough good managers to manage their operations is often a major
business concern. China's rapid growth in the past ten years has led to the emergence of a large
number of big and small enterprises in the country, and that in turn has created a critical shortage of
business managers. When good managers are not available, firms compromise by having understaffed
management, or by hiring managers who are otherwise not qualified. This eventually results in
mismanagement of resources, decline in product quality and overall business deterioration.
This introduction looks at some major human resource challenges faced by companies that try to hire
or retain their managers in China, particularly from the perspective of foreign firms. It will also discuss
the options these firms have when they try to decide who they should employ to manage their
businesses. Lastly, a brief history of management education in China is presented in the last section of
this chapter as background information for the supply-side case study in Chapter Three.
1.1 Challenges and Barriers
Although local Chinese firms are as hard hit as foreign firms are by the short supply of managerial
talent, foreign companies are usually bigger victims of business mismanagement due to the language
and cultural barriers they face in China. On the other hand, there are also some social phenomena in
China that pose business challenges to both local and foreign firms alike. The cases studied in Chapter
Two and Chapter Three will highlight some of these barriers and challenges found in actual business
environment.
The following subsections describe some unique but widespread phenomena found in the managerial
job market in China. These phenomena often dictate the human resource policies of firms operating in
China and directly affect their organization and competitiveness.
1.1.1 Critical Shortage of Managers
According to a 1997 article in Far Eastern Economic Review', Asia will face a critical shortage of
more than 3 millions managers by the year 2000. Although this figure may need revision in light of the
recent economic crisis in the region, the shortage of professional business managers will no doubt
continue to haunt most of the Asian economies, albeit to a smaller extent. Among the Asian countries,
China's shortage is most severe. Managers reportedly accounts for less than 3.8% of the workforce in
China, compared to 8.9% in the more industrialized countries like Japan, South Korea and New
Zealand. Following are some of the factors that contribute to the scarcity in managerial talent.
Strong Demand
As mentioned earlier, much of the strong demand was caused by the rapid economic growth in the past
decade. It was estimated that there are 250,000 to 300,000 foreign companies and joint ventures
operating in China today 2. China itself has about 400,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs). If each of
these operations needed just one professional manager, the demand is 700,000, far more than what is
available today.
Legacy of Socialism
Unlike other developing Asian countries where generations of managers learned from experience and
observation, the old socialist system and command economy left China with generations of managers
who lack the mindset and knowledge of market economy. They were trained to manage factories and
1 Alkman Granitsas, Trish Saywell, "Managing, Barely", Far Eastern Economic Review, August 28, 1997
2 Helen Johnstone, "Lesson in Supply and Demand," Asian Business, June 1, 1997
steel mills by output volume with little consideration of efficiency and profitability. It will be many
years before China can cultivate a new generation of managers with the proper market economy
mindset.
Severe Brain Drain
Since the early eighties, China has been losing many of its most brilliant scientists, engineers and
managers to the more developed countries where better education and career opportunities are much
more available. Tens of thousands of Chinese students and professionals are attracted to countries like
the U.S. and Singapore every year by better living, learning and working conditions and few of them
return. Many MBA students in the top American business schools, for example, prefer to work on Wall
Street than in Hong Kong. David Xu, an MBA student at Sloan with a PhD. degree in Microbiology
from Columbia University, spoke of his 49 classmates from the University of Science and Technology
China (USTC) in Anhui Province. Forty-five of them, and himself, are currently studying or working
in the United States, and they sometimes refer to their alma mater as "United States Training Center".
Lack of Education Resources
China only started its first MBA programs in 26 universities in 1991. Although these programs started
small (for example, the School of Economic and Management of Tsinghua University in Beijing
admitted only 14 students in 1991), they have been growing rapidly to cope with the huge market
demand. Besides rapid expansion of the existing management schools, the State Education Committee
is also trying to increase the supply of local business managers by setting up business and management
programs in more university. In 1997, MBA programs were introduced in 25 more universities,
doubling the number of universities offering graduate level management education.
Despite the effort to grow the local management education, there are still far fewer places than
applicants for these courses. Every year, more and better-qualified candidates are competing for a
limited number of places as these programs gain popularity among the local business communities. On
the average, only 25% of those who applied were admitted, and the acceptance rate at the top programs
are often much lower. For example, the China Europe International Business School in Shanghai only
accepted 5% of its applicants in 1997. While the National MBA Education Supervisory Committee is
going all out to grow these management programs, it is limited by the scarcity of qualified business
lecturers and suitable teaching materials in China. It was estimated that training 10 lecturers for each of
the 26 new business schools could take up to 10 years.
1.1.2 Training and Poaching
When qualified managers cannot be hired from the market, some firms choose to send their local
employees to management training courses. Large multinationals that need hundreds of managers often
consider management training as their most important long-term investment in China. While some
firms send their staff to regular MBA programs locally or overseas, others prefer to use less costly
executive training programs that last only months or even days. A few far-sighted firms even set up
regular in-house programs to systematically train their managerial candidates on leadership and
management skills.
For smaller companies that cannot afford to invest in training, "poaching" trained managers from other
firms becomes an attractive alternative. They use high salaries, fancy job titles, big bonuses and other
fringe benefits to lure qualified managers away from their competitors and neighbors. As a result,
those who were willing to invest in training before become reluctant to do so, fearing their trained
managers may leave before they could reap the benefits of their investment. Others continue to train,
but do so with much caution. Nabisco, for example, went to the extent of stopping the issuance
certificates to their Chinese employees who have completed training courses so that they cannot use
them in future job interviews.3
The end result of poaching is a vicious cycle in the managerial job market: poaching discourages
training, and that shrinks the pool of qualified managers. Shortage worsens as a result, and firms are
forced to resort to more headhunting. On the other side of the game, employees have to be rewarded
every time they job-hop, and that causes pay packages to steadily spiral up, encouraging even more
job-hopping. In 1997, for example, executive pay was growing at as much as 20% per year in China,
compared to only 7% in Hong Kong.
3 Tim Healy, "Mainland Lessons", Asiaweek, February 14, 1997
1.2 Hiring Options
For foreign firms looking to hire managers in China, what options do they have? To most of them, the
two most significant factors that enter into the hiring equation are the candidate's qualification and
nationality. The adequacy of a candidate's qualification depends on the specific post. Many firms
require formal management education, for example an MBA degree, or extensive management
experience, or both. For some positions, prior management experience in China would definitely help.
As for nationality, an employer may choose from many different categories, each with their own
advantages and disadvantages. The main groups include non-Chinese expatriates, local Chinese,
overseas Chinese, and company managers in other Asian countries who are ethnic Chinese. John
Quelch of Harvard Business School cautioned against seeing these as completely distinct categories.
Rather, he recommended that the company recognizes a continuum between the pure local national and
the pure expatriate, and that the company creates human resource databases containing relevant
information. Wah Hui Chu of Monsanto suggested measuring each candidate's "headquarters
credibility" and their "local knowledge," recognizing that both are important for senior managers to
succeed in China.4
1.2.1 Non-Chinese Expatriates
Chinese managerial practices in their current state of development are generally insufficient to run a
western-owned firm efficiently and profitably. The management skills and mindset inherited from
China's command era may paralyze a market-oriented firm. In such cases, foreign managers who
understand a business intimately are essential in the start-up stage when a firm first invests in China.
While western managers may not be ideal for China in the long run due to language and cultural
difficulties, they may be essential to the initial success of a firm's operation in China. Besides, having
good access to the top management at headquarters may well be a critical success factor of an offshore
operation. Bringing in expatriate managers who have strong relationship with the foreign headquarters
may be essential for the respect and credibility they bring.
"Who's The Boss? A Group Of Experts Debate A Crucial Question: Who Should Run The Overseas
Operation?" Wall Street Journal, September 26, 1996
- __ - Wmul_ ___
Beside cultural and language shortcomings, the main disadvantage of having western expatriates in
China is the "hardship pay" they command. An average expatriate at Hoechst, for example, costs
US$300,000 per year for salary, housing, children's education and other benefits. To this, the expenses
for interpreters and drivers must also be added. A local employee may cost just 10-20% of this
amount. Despite the high cost, some expatriates may only last a few months in China for many feel
compelled to leave when they find the culture shock to great to bear.
Some have the opposite problem. They feel that no subsequent assignment back home or anywhere
else in the world could possibly match the breadth of their responsibility and the exhilaration of their
China experience. Consequently, they choose not to return, but to remain in the region, trading on their
regional skills rather than their professional credentials. This is usually perceived as a heavy loss to the
firms that send them to China.
All in all, sending expatriate managers to China is not considered a good option in today's business
climate. They are perceived as expensive and ineffective. In fact, most foreign companies prefer to
have Chinese to manage their businesses in China. Cesar Bacani of Asiaweek has the following advice
for the western expatriates: "But don't count on staying in China for a long time. Think of it this way:
more than 1 billion Chinese want your job."6
1.2.2 Overseas Chinese
To many foreign firms, hiring overseas Chinese is the best option for their managerial recruitment in
China. The obvious reason is the Chinese language and cultural background this category of managers
have. Most of them speak Mandarin and at least one other Chinese dialect, and they grew up under the
deep influence of Chinese culture and traditional values. Such background and language skill allow
them to assimilate easily into the Chinese community in China and that greatly facilitates
communication in the daily operation of a firm. Sharing the same cultural heritage and language with
the local employees also allows the overseas Chinese managers to command trust and gain respect
quicker and easier.
5 "Who's The Boss?" Wall Street Journal, September 26, 96
6 Cesar Bacani, "Becoming a Foreigner", Asiaweek, February 14, 1997
Another attractive quality of the overseas Chinese managers is their strong business sense. Many of
them are citizens of Hong Kong (which was considered "overseas" not too long ago, and it still is in
many aspects), Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia, others are from the U.S.,
Australia and other western countries. The overseas Chinese population in these places are well
respected for their entrepreneurial spirits and their ability to accumulate wealth through hard work,
savings and strong survival instinct. To many employers, such qualities make them good managers in
China.
Overseas Chinese managers are also valued for the proficiency in English. Many of them come form
countries with long British colonial history, and they learn English as their second or third language at
their very early school age. In fact, many of them grow up in societies where English is used as the
official business language. Their good English allows overseas Chinese managers in China to
communicate easily with the overseas headquarters of western firms.
Since they are foreign nationals, most overseas Chinese command the same expatriate pay packages as
their western counterparts. They are therefore not considered a less costly alternative compared to the
western expatriates, but rather an option that provides more "bang for the buck."
1.2.3 Chinese Nationals From Abroad
Another option to consider is Chinese nationals studying or working abroad, especially those who
reside in the home country of the firm concerned. This may be a good or bad recruitment tactic,
depending on the background of the candidate and his/her experience. The obvious strength of this
option is that by hiring a Chinese person who is familiar with the company's home country, the
employer gets the best of both worlds: someone who understands Chinese language and culture, and
someone with western language and cultural exposure.
Unfortunately, the recruiter cannot take the above assumptions for granted. He/she should research
how long the candidate has been away from China to judge if the much desired country knowledge
does indeed still exist, and find out the candidate's attitude about returning home. "Some of these
candidates find the business culture [in China] unfathomable because they left long ago. At the same
time, their local co-workers often are quickly dismayed by the newcomers' foreign ways and resent
them and their high pay packages.... For their part, the managers find themselves caught between two
cultures and often torn by divided loyalties. Their blood ties make them keenly aware of the need to
adapt to local business customs... but [that may lead them to] alienate the home office." 7
One possible solution is to offer "cultural translators" to managers who have been away a long time.
For example, Amoco Corp., Alltel, and Avon offer cross-cultural training to ethnic expatriates.
Another solution, according to Wang & Li Asia Resources, a California-base recruitment firm, is to
place ethnic Chinese "who aren't expecting special privileges and who realize they need to fit in
immediately" in order to prevent the development of cliques and potentially damaging resentment.
However, many returning Chinese managers today expect to be treated as corporate employees who
happen to be in China, rather than Chinese employees who are likely to make their career with the firm
in China only. They have been exposed to multinational career paths, opportunities and rewards when
they were abroad, and they want to be part of the corporate game. Today, they are scarce enough in
number to walk away confidently from any company that is not willing to fulfill these expectations.
1.2.4 Local Chinese
To last option discussed here is hiring local Chinese managers and providing them with the appropriate
managerial training to supplement their inherent shortcomings, if any. The best justification to hire this
category of managers is of course their local knowledge and their local business network. For the same
level of experience and academic credential, they also cost many times less than the expatriate
managers.
On the other hand, foreign managers may find it difficult to select effective local managers due to
language difficulty. When interviewing Chinese candidates, western managers have a tendency to
equate good use of English and westernized behavior with good managerial skills. They may also take
for granted that a local person must have the political, cultural, and social skills to be effective locally,
which may or may not be the case. It is particularly important for a foreign interviewer to keep in mind
that a well-connected manager does not always make a good manager in China. There is more to
7 "Management: Is Transfer To Native Land A Passport To Trouble?", Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1996
8 "Management: Is Transfer To Native Land A Passport To Trouble?", Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1996
management in China than being able to pull a few strings and being able to speak fluently in the local
dialect.
Among the local Chinese, there are two further choices: experienced managers or fresh graduates from
universities. Experienced managers can be headhunted from the SOEs or other companies in the
neighborhood. They usually cost more than the new management graduates to hire, but they can be
productive from day one, provided they do not have some desirable old work habits to "unlearn". On
the other hand, the young graduates are particularly attractive because of their university education,
and their ability to learn quickly. Most of them have not learned the "SOE mindset" and can therefore
be trained to accept market economy concepts with relative ease, especially if they were graduates
from one of the few local MBA programs in China.
1.3 Management Education in China
1.3.1 Introduction
As China opened its door to foreign investments in recent years and as Chinese enterprises began to
venture out to the global market, it has become increasingly clear that a good supply of local managers
is essential to the well being of China's economic future. As a result, professional management
education took center stage in the economic reform process and became a priority item in the Chinese
education system. "In order to build a socialism with Chinese characteristics, we need a large pool of
economics and management talent. They know the basic principles of market economy, are familiar
with its operation, and at the same time have a good understanding of Chinese enterprises," said Zhu
Rongji, the newly elected premier of China and Dean of Economic and Management School of
Tsinghua University in Beijing (Appendix 1). At a more personal level, Zhu expressed his concern and
expectation for management education in China when he visited Tsinghua's business school in 1994.
"If only each of you can set straight a Chinese enterprise, I see hope in our country," he told the
business school students during a dialogue with them.
To assess the demand in the managerial job market in China, the Economic and Trade Commission
(ETC) of China did a "leadership quality" survey on large- and medium-size state-owned enterprises in
1995. The survey reported that 77.2% of state-owned factory managers or deputy managers were
university-degree holders, and 68% hold degrees in sciences or engineering. "However, very few of
these managers had formal management training or know how to manage professionally," said the
report. In October the same year, the ETC set a specific target for the schools of management in China:
they were expected to eventually produce five thousand professional managers for the country per
9year.
In fact, MBA education in China began as early as 1988 when a special committee, known as the
National MBA Education Supervisory Committee, was formed by the State Education Commission to
study the feasibility of offering MBA programs in Chinese universities. Between 1988 and 1989, the
9 Source : "Working Towards an Excellent Chinese MBA Education," http://www.em.tsinghua.edu.cn/docsc/
mba/cmcc.htm
committee studied foreign MBA programs, investigated local demand, and evaluated the capabilities
of local institutions in conducting MBA programs. In 1990, a detail proposal for MBA education was
submitted to and approved by the parliament. Included in the proposal were details on admission
criteria, curriculum design, training methodology and degree requirements. In 1991, nine major
universities were selected to launch a pilot batch of MBA programs in China. By 1993, the total
number of pilot MBA programs increased to 26. At the same time, resources were pooled among these
universities to put together a set of national guidelines and standards for various aspects of a Chinese
MBA education. A nationwide database was also set up to collect and to maintain Chinese case study
materials for teaching and research purposes. The first batch of less than 200 local Chinese MBA
students graduated from the pioneer classes in 1994. In the same year, 1800 new MBA students in
search of better career were admitted to the fast expanding MBA programs to begin their management
educationl.
In the years that follow, continuing efforts were made to ensure sufficient good students, teaching
resources and financial support were channeled to the new Chinese MBA programs. A national task
group continued to improve the content and expand the capacity of MBA education in China. In 1997,
an addition of twenty-five institutions was authorized to offers MBA programs in China, making the
total MBA programs fifty-one nationwide. In the same year, a total of 10,982 candidates enrolled to sit
for the MBA entrance examination, "surprising even the most optimistic MBA educators.""
"When the MBA program was first introduced in 1991, most people did not know what an "MBA"
was. Some even confused it with "NBA", the American National Basketball Association," said Mr.
Zheng Shao-Lian, Dean of Fudan University's School of Management in Shanghai. Today, getting an
MBA has become the gateway to success for many ambitious young people in China. Every year,
more and more applicants compete for the very limited number of spaces in the MBA programs. In
1997, for example, only ten percent of some one thousand applicants for Fudan University's MBA
program were accepted. The primary concern today is the lack of qualified teaching resources and
facilities to run more MBA programs in order to satisfy the fast increasing market needs.
10 The MBA program of Tsinghua University in Beijing, for example, only graduated 14 and 19 MBA students in
1994 and 1995 respectively. By September 1997, 284 new MBA students were admitted.
" Source : "News On-Line", School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University
(http://www/em.tsinghua.edu.cn/docsc/committee 1/nmbac4.htm)
1.3.2 Admission Criteria
Compared to a typical MBA program in the West, Chinese MBA programs do have some unique
Chinese characteristics due to the socialist environment in which they operate. A standardized national
examination was introduced nationwide in 1997 to admit students to the various MBA programs.
According to the "Application and Admission Guideline" published on the Tsinghua University
homepage, prospective MBA students who wish to sit for the standardized entrance examination must
satisfy the following conditions:
- The candidate must support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party; willing to serve in the
modernization of socialism; have good conduct and be law-abiding;
" The candidate, depending on his/her prior academic qualification, must have the following
minimum work experience:
Academic Qualification Minimum work Experience
Undergraduate degree holders 3 years
Vocational school diploma holders 5 years
Graduate degree holders 2 years
- The candidate must not exceed forty years of age.
- The candidate must be in good health, as certified by the standard medical examination.
= An employed candidate must obtain an official approval from his/her employers to attend the
program. Other candidates must present proof of residency issued by the local government or work
unit (danwei) responsible for their personnel files.
Standardized MBA Entrance Examination
Due to lack of experience in conducting MBA programs, much inconsistency was found among the 26
pilot programs in the early years of MBA education in China. Not only were there large discrepancies
in curriculum content and teaching quality, the admission criteria varied considerably among programs
offered by different universities. In order to achieve an acceptable level of consistency in the
admission process, the State Education Committee, the Academic Degrees Committee of the State
Council and the 26 universities concerned formed the National MBA Entrance Examination Research
Center to develop a standardized MBA entrance examination. The new examination, known as the
GRK ("Guanli Ruxue Kaoshi" or "Official Entrance Examination"), was designed to both reflect
Chinese characteristics and meet international standard. The first GRK was introduced to the
applicants seeking admission in 1997.
The GRK examination for MBA programs in China can be thought of as equivalent to the Graduate
Management Admission Test (GMAT) in the graduate school admission process of the American
system. However, the Chinese standardized examination covers a wider range of subjects and is
therefore a much longer test for the prospective MBA students. The 1997 GRK consists of five 3-hour
written examinations for the following subjects: Political Studies, Foreign Language (English,
Japanese or Russian), Mathematics, Management, and Language & Logic. While the respective
universities set the examination questions for Political Studies, a national MBA examination
committee centrally set questions for all other subjects.
"The standardized entrance examination is in fact a very good element in China's MBA education,"
said Mr. Philip Kwok, the Program Liaison for MIT Sloan School of Management in Hong Kong.
"Since having an MBA degree has become such a lucrative qualification in China, there was always a
fear of "backdoor admission" for unqualified students. For example, some rich or politically connected
parents may try to secure places for their children through bribery or political influences. With the
GRK and its transparent administration, those who are truly qualified can now compete fairly for a
much sought-after place in their target MBA programs. That ultimately helps to preserve fairness and
high quality in the entire system."
Unlike the American system, Chinese MBA candidates have to decide which two universities to apply
to before the entrance examination, and they have to sit for the examination in their first-choice
university. The MBA admission committee of each university is free to set up its own criteria to admit
its pool of candidates based on their first-round GRK results. The minimum acceptable GRK score for
each program and the selectivity of the second-round process depend on the size of the candidate pool
and the available resources of a given MBA program. Short-listed candidates usually have to go
through a series of interviews, or even more written examinations before the final admission decisions
are made. The discrepancy between the more popular programs and the less popular ones remain quite
high. For example, the most popular Fudan University MBA program attracted 965 candidates in 1997,
whereas only 65 candidates chose to compete for a place in Tzongnan Finance University.
1.3.3 Curriculum and Content
Although the National Guiding Committee for MBA Education has set fundamental standard
requirements and guidelines for the content and teaching of all MBA programs, the individual
programs are allowed to maintain their own characteristics to a certain extent. However, the committee
requires each MBA degree candidates to complete a thesis.
Much of the teaching material currently used in Chinese MBA programs is based on that used at
respected US and European business schools. Corporate finance and accounting, for example, were
transferred wholesale from the West. However, there has always been a desire to localize the content
so that students could learn from business cases that are more relevant to their future career. Much
efforts are being put into developing business case studies based on success or failure stories of
Chinese firms. Case development is also a costly endeavor. More funding for case research and case
writing must be allocated before good quality Chinese cases can become the major learning tool for
Chinese MBA students.
1.3.4 International Collaboration
Given the large number of foreign companies operating in China and their desire to localize their
management teams, it is in the interest of these companies to help develop management education in
China. With funding provided by firms with business interests in China, educational institutions and
trade organizations from the United States and Europe began to introduce MBA-type management
training in China since the late 80's. While some of them provide such programs independently as
foreign institutions, most formed educational joint ventures with local institutions to share risks and
resources. Unlike MBA programs offered by local Chinese universities that focus on training managers
for local Chinese enterprises, almost all of these so-called international MBA programs were designed
to prepare managers for foreign enterprises in China. Compared to the local MBA programs, these
programs have curricula that place heavier emphasis on foreign languages and global business and
management knowledge. Since their courses are usually taught in English by American or European
instructors, only students who have achieved a reasonable level of English proficiency are admitted.
The China European International Business School (CEIBS) is probably the best know among all
international management programs in China. CEIBS started as a collaboration between the European
Union and China's Jiaotong University in Shanghai in 1984. Since the launch of its first international
MBA program, CEIBS management programs have quickly become extremely popular among
Chinese managers who set their career target at better paying jobs in foreign joint ventures. Although
its 20-month MBA course charges a fee of US$4,000, almost twice the annual income of an average
Chinese, thousands of applicants compete for less than a hundred places in the program every year. On
their Internet homepage,12 CEIBS claimed to have educated more than 50 percent of all MBA
graduates in China.
Some major international collaborative management programs found in China are listed in the table on
the following page:
12 http://www.ceibs.edu/
Chinese Partnership Established Enrolment Remarks
University since in 1997
China Europe Shanghai Jiaotong Nov 1984 130 Also run an Executive
International University / The MBA program.
Business European Foundation for Acceptance Rate: 5%,
School Management Total Tuition :
(CEIBS) Development RMB40,000 (local),
US$ 15,000 (foreign)
Dalian State University of New 1984 unknown During the last three
University of York at Buffalo, months the 2-year
Technology Rutgers, the State program, students go to
University of New the United States to
Jersey study, practice and
conduct research
Guanghua Taiwan Guanghua December unknown
School of Educational Foundation 1993
Management
of Peking
University
Tsinghua MIT Sloan School of 1996 40 Total tuition in 1998-
University Management, 2000 : 40,000 RMB
School of Cambridge,
Economics Massachusetts
and
Management
Fudan MIT Sloan School of 1996 40
University Management,
School of Cambridge,
Management Massachusetts
Private companies that feel obliged to do their parts in contributing to the management education in
China sometimes do so by providing sponsorship to business schools and management education
programs. Recently, Coca-Cola committed 500,000 RMB (US$60,350) to the Business Management
School of Shanghai's Fudan University, to be used for teachers' awards, graduate scholarships and the
purchase of new teaching equipment and materials. In Beijing, Hang Seng Bank form Hong Kong
donated a purpose-built building to Tsinghua University's Economics and Management School for its
future expansion.
1.3.5 Career Options and Prospect
The career path of a Chinese MBA student often depends on how his/her MBA education is financed.
Currently, many Chinese MBA students are employees sponsored by state-owned enterprises. For
these students, they are obliged to return to their original SOEs to fulfill the contracts of their
sponsorship. They usually have to work for four to seven years before they become "free agents"
again.
Those who pay for their own business education do have a lot more options. Few of them choose to
work for an SOE after their graduation. Foreign and joint ventures firms are high on their priority lists
because they can usually ask for a salary three to five time higher than their pre-MBA pay. According
to some MBA students, their "pecking order" among foreign firms are American and European,
Japanese and Korean, Taiwanese and Hong Kong, and lastly South East Asian. Most of them quoted
salary, training and reputation of the firms as their main career considerations.
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Chapter Two - Demand-Side Case Studies
China's reform and open-door policy had attracted a large amount of foreign investment to the country
since the late 80's. Hundreds of thousands of foreign enterprises have set up factories and offices in
China to exploit its cheap labor for export manufacturing, and to produce and market all types of goods
and services to its mysterious 1.2-billion consumers. These factories and businesses in China need to
be managed, but qualified management talent has always been in short supply, partly due to the great
demand, and partly due to the legacy of a socialist economy.
This chapter studies the demand side of the managerial HR market in China by examining three
different HR models:
1. The American or western model that emphasizes formal training;
2. A low-risk but less commonplace model that happens to be Japanese; and
3. The overseas Chinese model based on ethnic connections.
A Caveat - Although a nationality or an ethnic group is associated with each of these models, such
associations are used only to convey a preliminary observation (especially in the case of the second
model, and probably with the exception of the overseas Chinese model), and to facilitate the
organization of this thesis. Further research needs to be done to prove or disprove such associations,
but that is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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2.1 Let's Train Them - The American Model
When large American multinationals from the automobile or telecommunication industries invest in
China, they often do so by having major joint ventures or large greenfield operations involving
hundreds of millions of dollars of foreign direct investments. They build large and modem
manufacturing facilities or assembly plants, and hire thousands of locals to work in these facilities.
They are often required to transfer technologies to the local partners and employees, but they are also
given the rights to sell to the national market and to export what they produce in return. This section of
the chapter studies the managerial HR problems and strategy of Motorola China, a typical large-scale
American investment in China. A day in life of a typical manager in Motorola China is also described
to highlight some relevant HR issues.
2.1.1 Company Background
Motorola is a leading supplier of advanced telecommunications and electronics equipment in China.
The company set up its first representative office in Beijing in 1987. Since then, its business has grown
rapidly in China, leading to the incorporation of Motorola (China) Electronics Limited (MCEL) in
Beijing, a wholly owned Motorola company and headquarters of China operations. MCEL's current
product mix in China includes cellular phones, pagers, radio communications systems, and
communications and semiconductor components.
Motorola's operations have been "very successful" in China. In 1996, its combined sales to China and
Hong Kong were US$3.1 billion, or approximately 11% of the company's worldwide revenues.
Motorola's investment and committed investment in China totaled US$1.2 billion, making it the
largest U.S. investor in China. Motorola exported US$1 billion worth of products and services from
the U.S. to China in 1996, supporting jobs in Arizona, Florida, Illinois, and Texas. However, it is not
clear how much profit Motorola has made in China.
Today, Motorola employs more than 10,000 employees in China in some twenty manufacturing
facilities, R&D centers and corporate offices. Managing such a sizable workforce on a foreign land is
obviously a very challenging task for Motorola. The author interviewed Mr. Yao Weimin, the Section
Head for "Leadership Development & Strategic Talent Sourcing" in Beijing to learn how Motorola
recruits and manages their management talent in China. In order to take a closer look at the life of an
expatriate manager in China, the author also traveled to Tianjin, a city 120 kilometers northeast of
Beijing, to visit Mr. Arthur Tan,"' a manager at Motorola's Tianjin Paging Operations.
2.1.2 Problems and Challenges
Although Motorola does face all the managerial HR issues discussed in Chapter One as a large
corporation operating in China, Yao singled out two problems as most challenging to Motorola China
today. "Having built up a reputation as a good employer in China in the past decade, getting managers
to work for us is less of a problem today than it used to be a few years ago. If we cannot find a suitable
candidate locally, we can always find someone in the region through our recruitment network. Today,
we also have big enough local workforces at all levels to allow us to promote from within. Once we
have someone in a managerial position, our good training programs can usually make sure he or she
performs to our expectation." According to Yao, the biggest problems for Motorola today are those
related to retention and localization.
Retention
As good managers are still scarce in China, those who are experienced and well trained command high
salaries and are very attractive to other firms. "Many Hong Kong and Taiwanese firms come after the
people we have trained, and hire them away at higher salary," said Mr. Sim Lee, general manager of
the Paging Manufacturing Plant in Tianjin 2 . Attracting potential management talent has also become
an increasingly challenging task, particularly when Motorola adopts a strategy of "low pay, but lots of
education and training." "We had an excellent internship employee who was a senior at Tianjin
University," said Mr. Yao, "but we could not keep her because she had scholarship from four
American universities for graduate engineering studies, in addition to more lucrative offers from other
companies."
" Name disguised at interviewee's request
12 Cutler, Liang and Yan, "Motorola China - Human Resources 1997 (A)", Case Report, MIT Sloan School of
Management, April 1997.
In Yao's opinion, most managers in China leave a company because of cultural conflicts or better
salary elsewhere. "Another firm can always offer a salary which is too good for someone to refuse if
that firm really wants that person." Otherwise, some managers leave because they find it difficult to
adopt to the company culture of a workplace or cannot get along with some of their bosses or
colleagues. According to Yao, Motorola China has an annual attrition rate of 10%, but he was not sure
if that figure also applies to the turnover at the managerial levels. When managers leave, Motorola
China always try to fill the new vacancies by promoting from within first before they recruit from the
outside job market.
Salary Discrepancy
As Motorola tried to localize their managerial workforce by replacing expatriates with local hires, re-
aligning the compensations of these two groups of managers becomes another challenging task for
them. When more local managers are being promoted to higher levels of management, situations in
which two managers having the same responsibilities but getting very different salaries began to
appear. They cannot offer the local managers the same kind of compensations as what the expatriate
managers at the same level are getting because that defeats one of the major reasons to localize, that is,
to reduce costs. On the other hand, trying to equalize compensation by undercutting the expatriate
managers is difficult since they are still in demand as long as 100% localization is not achieved.
On this issue, Motorola is apparently taking a middle-ground approach currently. They are trying to
pay the local managers well enough to keep them loyal and to make them feel they are fairly treated.
On the other hand, they are also gradually cutting back on some conspicuous expatriate benefits at
some levels of their management to reduce overhead costs and to eliminate some compensation
discrepancy. For example, some expatriate allowances were lowered recently and the number of paid
holidays for some managers have been reduced. Since personal compensation is always a sensitive
issue anywhere, Motorola will have to handle the situation very carefully However, this is only a
problem during a transition period which will disappear on its own with the attainment of full
management localization in the future.
2.1.3 Policies and Strategies
This section studies some major managerial HR strategies Motorola uses in China to address the above
and other problems.
Overseas Chinese
Like many other foreign enterprises in China, Motorola relies heavily on overseas Chinese to manage
their operation in China. According to Yao, about 90% of their expatriate managers have Chinese
cultural and language background. Among them, more than half are from Malaysia or Singapore. For
example, Mr. P. Y. Lai, the President of Motorola China Electronic Limited (MCEL), is a Chinese
Malaysian who joined Motorola after working for Intel for twenty years.
Another example is Mr. Sim Lee, the General Manager of the Paging Manufacturing Plant in Tianjin,
the largest and most profitable plant in China. Lee worked as a manager in Motorola Malaysia for
more than 5 years before he was transferred to China. As a Chinese Malaysian, Lee speaks both
English and Mandarin fluently. When asked about life as an expatriate in China, he mentioned a few
difficulties in adjusting to local lifestyle when he first went to Tianjin. Most of the difficulties he
brought up were related to inconvenience and lack of entertainment. For example, his wife found it
difficult to shop for groceries and there was nowhere to go at night. The barrier of cultural differences
most expatriates encounter when they work abroad did not appear to be a big concern for him. A more
detailed description of an expatriate's life in China is presented in Section 2.1.4 below.
Motorola China prefers to employ overseas Chinese managers because of their regional experience in
marketing, distribution, manufacturing operations and their language capabilities. These qualities are
especially valuable during the start-up phase of Motorola's operation in Tianjin. The success of these
managers can be seen from the fact that the Motorola Tianjin plant broke Motorola's corporate record
by achieving Six Sigma Quality, a very stringent and much coveted quality measure, in the shortest
time in the history of the firm.
Localization
Motorola considers China a manufacturing base and a major market. The company's $1.2 billion
investment demonstrates its long-term commitment to the Chinese market. Besides having a very
aggressive policy to source for manufacturing components locally, they also matches their
commitment with a proactive human resources strategy of "management localization," which focuses
on hiring and training employees who are either local or have a strong mainland Chinese background.
Motorola believes that to be deeply rooted in China and successful, it needs people who have a
significant level of local expertise and who are familiar with Motorola's products, technologies,
corporate management and culture.
Motorola's management localization is being implemented in three different stages of increasing
"Chineseness". During the first stage, Motorola brought in overseas Chinese managers from Southeast
Asia, mainly from Singapore and Malaysia, to lead their management in China (see "Overseas
Chinese" section above). Once the basic management structure is in place, stage two was introduced to
identify and recruit high-caliber Chinese students studying overseas. Yao himself was a good case in
point. He has an MBA degree and was recruited by Motorola when he was pursuing his master's
degree in Urban Studies at MIT. "My education in the U.S. provided me with a good understanding of
modern management in Western market economy, from which I can draw upon and apply to
Motorola's business in China," said Yao. Direct overseas recruitment is usually for high-level
management positions only, and these positions command much higher pay then the local hires.
The final stage, which is also the ultimate goal of Motorola's management localization is to have local
Chinese people managing the China operation. "Right now you can still see a lot foreign managers,
particularly Chinese-speaking managers from other Asian countries," said Lee, "but we expect the
majority of managers to be local Chinese within the next two to three years." Motorola projected that
by the year 2000, 60% of their managers in China would be local Chinese.
Yao told the author about the bottom-up approach of Motorola's localization plan. There are about ten
management levels in Motorola worldwide, from the CEO on the top to production supervisors and
group leaders at the entry level. The localization scheme started at the lowest level and is gradually
moving up the hierarchy. According to Yao, about 20% of senior managers in China are now locals
and 80% are still expatriates. However, at the lower levels, 80% of the mid-level managers are
currently locals, whereas levels of small-department managers and below (supervisors and group
leaders) are all localized. The highest ranked local managers at Motorola China now are department
heads.
Motorola China is doing all they can to localize their management so that they can reduce cost, build a
management team that is highly familiar with the local environment, and to provide employment
locally so as to improve their relationship with the local government. They plan to achieve their target
through good marketing, effective recruitment procedures and excellent in-house training programs.
However, given the large contingent of expatriate managers they currently have, they are also obliged
to redeploy their existing leadership in China regionally or even globally.
Training
It is a Motorola global policy that every employee, from the CEO to the accounts clerks, must go
through a minimum of 40 hours of training per year. According to Yao, the training hours are much
longer in China - the average is probably 70-80 hours per employee per year, and some employees
have as many as 100 to 200 hours. Motorola University, Motorola's corporate training organization
that designs, develops and delivers training courses and consulting services to its employees
worldwide, established its first Chinese branch in Beijing in 1993, and a second branch in Tianjin two
years later. Training programs were customized for the Chinese environment to provide highly
relevant training to Motorola's Chinese employees, business partners and government officials.
Besides technology transfer, one of the key missions of Motorola University in China is to
complement Motorola's management localization plan by providing management training to candidates
at all levels. Managers in Motorola China have various opportunities to receive training, including on-
site and overseas training. The Chinese Accelerated Management Program (CAMP) stands out as the
company's flagship education initiative. It was introduced in 1994 as an intensive management
training program for high-potential Chinese employees. The 10-month program includes classroom
and on-the-job training, as well as a two-month overseas assignment. It covers basic management
knowledge, problem solving skills, communication techniques, administrative skills and other micro
and macro leadership skills. "Every trainee in CAMP has at least an undergraduate degree, some even
have graduate degrees," said Yao.
Besides having full-time teaching staff in Motorola University branches in China, managers from
various departments are sometimes invited to teach short courses in training programs. Senior
managers share their personal experiences and knowledge with management trainees and help to
provide teaching material for locally customized courses. Based on changes in the local environment
and feedback from the trainees, existing program are constantly being improved upon, and sometimes
new training programs are introduced when the needs arise. For example, LEAD (or Leadership
Effectiveness Advanced Development), a 250-hour leadership training program, was introduced
recently in China as an effort to accelerate the management localization process.
According to Yao, instead of offering high salaries like other firms do, Motorola prefers to provide
good training to attract and retain their managers. Although the costs can be just as high - Yao
estimated the cost of training some of the managers to be as high as the cost of sending them to attend
overseas MBA programs - Motorola gets the benefit of having a highly-skilled management team as
long as these managers stay with the firm. Considering the fact that high-pay managers can still be
lured away by even higher pay, this is probably a good HR strategy to maintain a high-quality
management team in places where managerial human resources are highly mobile. Such strategy can
probably be even more effective if a large portion of the training is firm specific, since the trained
managers are more likely to stay if the skills they gained from training are not appreciated elsewhere.
On the other hand, the author believes, unlike technical training, management and leadership training
transfers general skills that are applicable rather universally in any firms. Due to this reason, Motorola
in China is still running the risk of training good managers for other firms in their neighborhood. A
senior manager at Motorola agreed with this observation when asked.
Rewards and Compensation
Being a big country operation in an established worldwide organization, Motorola China has a well
established and systematic scheme to reward their managers at all levels. Expatriates managers usually
receive an additional allowance on top of their original home-country salary. Besides, they are also
rewarded with company cars, free family housing, annual home leaves, and other standard "expatiate
perks" enjoyed by their American counterparts. The local managers are well rewarded, too. They enjoy
salaries that are "much higher" than the local average, good medical care, and a very conducive
working environment. However, as mentioned earlier in this section, they are not entitled to most of
the fringe benefits expatriate managers at the same levels are having.
To provide better incentives to their local management, Motorola has recently begun an employee
home ownership program to build apartment buildings and sell the units to their managers on attractive
terms. The program covers construction financing, mortgage financing to the employees, funds for
community amenities and a portion of the mortgage payment liability. The direct objective for this
program is to attract and retain the best employees, particularly managers, by providing a high-quality
living environment. Even though the first two buildings were ready for occupancy by the end of 1996,
demand still far exceeds supply. A home ownership program like this would improve management
retention rate, assuming Motorola China has made the necessary legal, financial and social
arrangement to "repossess" these apartments should the managers leave the firm before the end of the
minimum employment period agreed upon.
2.1.4 An Expatriate's Life
Mr. Arthur Tan has been a Manager for Motorola Tianjin's paging facility for the past three years. He
is a Chinese Malaysian in his mid-thirty, and he lives in a company apartment in Tianjin City with his
mother, his wife and his infant daughter. Tan does not have a university degree or any professional
management training, but he has more than 18 years of work experience to compensate for it. He left
Malaysia to work in Singapore after graduating from high school, and spent most of his working life
on the island state before joining Motorola in China. Tan worked for Motorola for three years in
Singapore in the late 80's before he left to join another Fortune-500 company as a regional marketing
manager. When Motorola needed managers in their new investment in Tianjin, they made Tan an offer
that he could not refuse. Tan moved to Tianjin with his wife in 1995.
The author was shown to Tan's office adjacent to a pager production line in Motorola Manufacturing
in Tianjin, and was allowed to observe him work for half of the afternoon. He was busy on the phone
most of the time and hardly had time to be interviewed. While on the phone, he negotiated for delivery
schedules and quantities most of the time, using English, Malay, Mandarin, Cantonese and a number of
other Chinese dialects interchangeably, convincing or negotiating with his colleagues and suppliers in
Beijing, Hong Kong, Penang, Singapore and the U.S. Most of Tan's subordinates were young local
Chinese and they sometimes waited in line outside his office to seek his advice or to have him sign
documents. "Many of them are university graduates and they are all very capable people," said Tan.
"We are trying to get more and more of them to move up to higher levels in the management."
At around 6:00 p.m., the phone began to quiet down and Tan's colleagues were seen leaving the office.
"This is the time of the day when I can actually get some work done around here," said Tan, while
reading and replying email on his Apple computer. Part of Tan's responsibility involves dealing with
local government officials and local suppliers, and he often has to entertain them to "keep up a good
working relationship". "I used your visit to excuse myself from going to a business dinner tonight, but
most of the evenings I am obliged to entertain someone, be it some local officials or visitors from other
Motorola offices." Tan also complained that he had to consume a lot more liquor after coming to
China because of the excessive business entertainment, and his wife was not particularly happy about
that. "Refusing to drink at a business dinner is socially unacceptable here. So far, I know of only one
person who can get away with it, and that was because he has a genuine medical certificate to prove
that he is unfit to drink," said Tan. "Both my wife and I have to accept this because it is part of my
China deal,"
Tan left his office at around 8:00 p.m. that evening after signing the last document on his desk and
making sure a visiting colleague from the head-office get a ride to the plant the next morning. He
invited the author to have dinner at home with his family and stay a night in his apartment. The ride
from Motorola's facility to Tan's apartment took about forty-five minutes, and we were driven there
comfortably in Tan's chauffeur-driven Toyota limousine. On the way, Tan talked about getting a new
minivan from the company the following week so that they can be driven around more comfortably
when his father visits him later this year. He also called his wife using his made-in-China Motorola
cellular phone twenty minutes before we arrived so that she could steam the fish for our dinner with
the timing just right.
In the car, Tan finally had time to tell the author more about his being an expatriate in China. "I
accepted the offer because it was financially rewarding and because I believe this is a good experience
to show on my resum6. However, I have to work really hard and be on my toes all the time, and this is
the result," said Tan, pointing at his mostly-gray hair. Tan's main concern was his family, and he was
not sure how long more his wife was willing to stay in China. According to Tan, another concern many
expatriates like him have is their career after their postings to China. Should he decide not to renew his
expatriate contract in China after it expires, the company may not have a suitable position at home for
him to return to. In fact, Tan's contract for China was going to expire in a few months, and he was still
undecided between the options of renewing his China contract or accepting a short-term head-office
position in Texas. "I really can't tell what my long-term career plan is. I just want to make sure I save
up enough now so that my family can still live comfortably when good positions like this are not
available any more."
On the issue of compensation, Tan said he really had nothing to complain about. Besides being
rewarded with a good salary, a company car, a full-time driver, a part-time housemaid, annual home
leave and family housing, expatriate managers like Tan and their families also get to go on a short
vacation every month with all expenses paid for by the company. "They are still taking good care of
us, but I heard some of these perks will gradually be taken away from some of us as they try to
equalize the compensations between local and expatriate managers." However, Tan did not seem too
worry, probably because he did not think Motorola's localization efforts would affect managers at his
level before he decides to leave China.
Dinner was almost ready when we arrived at Tan's "home away from home", a high-rise apartment in
a prime area in the city of Tianjin. The 2000-sq-ft unit had three bedrooms and a large living room, and
was quite luxuriously furnished. According to Tan, Motorola paid more than US$5,000 per month for
the rental of his apartment alone. At the dinner table, Mrs. Tan thanked the author for bringing her
husband home early ("he is seldom home before 10:30") so that their 6-month-old daughter can spend
some time with him.
Sitting in the living room after dinner, the author asked Mrs. Tan about her life as an expatriate's wife.
"It was really difficult and inconvenient when we first came [three years ago]. Many things that were
readily available in grocery stores or supermarkets in Singapore were simply not found here. Besides,
the only entertainment for us in Tianjin then was shopping during the weekends. There are some
interesting places in Beijing, but they are two hours away." Mrs. Tan conceded that things have
improved over the past three years as Tianjin became more developed, but "the air is still polluted, the
streets still dirty, and the people still rude." Although she sometimes spent her day visiting other
expatriates' wives in the neighborhood, most of the time she felt bored and lonely until they had their
first child. Mrs. Tan decided to deliver in Singapore last October because she "did not trust the
hospitals in Tianjin". Tan's mother joined them in Tianjin soon after so that she could spend some time
with her son and helped take care of her first granddaughter.
2.1.5 Conclusion
Motorola's investment in China represents a business model shared by a large group of American and
European multinationals. They view China as a huge potential market for their mass-market products
but they believe much need to be invested before they can reap substantial profits in the long run. They
invest heavily in large greenfield projects or major joint ventures, and they require large teams of
professional managers to run their Chinese operations. Since few western expatriates are able to
manage effectively in China, they turn to the overseas Chinese population in the region for managerial
human resources. As the cost of such strategy increases with increasing demand for overseas Chinese
managers, investors in China began to localize their management in China by providing systematic
leadership and management training to qualified locals. Although the short-term costs of such training
are high, they hope it will turn out to be cost-effective in the long run if good compensation schemes
can be implemented to effectively reward and retain their trained managers.
Retention is no doubt the key issue in this strategy. In the case of Motorola for example, they wish to
attract managerial candidates with their excellent training programs, but they definitely have no
intention to become a training school for other firms which may poach their well-trained managers.
Given the general applicability of management and leadership skills, any efforts to promote job loyalty
among locally trained managers are at best moderately successful so far.
Another major issue is the transition from heavy reliance on overseas Chinese to full localization. The
firms concerned must device the appropriate HR plans to redeploy their overseas Chinese managers
after they were replaced by local management. Equalizing the compensation schemes for the
expatriates and the local managers is yet another HR challenge that has caused some major concerns
during the transition.
2.2 Let's Buy Them - A Japanese Model
This section studies the case of a less common model that happens to be a Japanese beer brewery.
Although the author was not able to study this case in as much depth as he wanted to because of time
and budget constraints, this case is included in this thesis due to its uniqueness and its apparent
success. It is different from the American model in the previous section because no costly recruiting
and training were involved. The firm concerned has also avoided some high operating costs by
minimizing the need for expatriate managers. The initial investment in this case may be high compared
to other models, but the risk of failure due to poor management is small because a good choice was
made in selecting the investment target.
2.2.1 Case Background
Kirin Beer was first introduced in Japan in 188813. After dominating the Japanese beer market for more
than a century, Kirin still has the largest market share (43% - 44%) in Japan today. Outside Japan,
Kirin Brewery Co. Ltd. ranks seventh in the worldwide beer industry in terms of shipment volume.
Their flagship Kirin Lager was also the fifth most popular beer in the world in 1996. However, more
than 30% of Kirin's revenue in 1996 was derived from non-beer businesses, including soft drinks,
liquors and wines, pharmaceutical products, agribio businesses (seedling, flower trading, genetic
engineering, etc.), restaurant outlets and engineering. In 1996, Kirin sold V580 billion 14 of beer, Y242
billion of soft drinks and V59.7 billion of other products, making a net profit of V34.4 billion.
According to Kirin's 1996 annual report, Taiwan was Kirin's "largest and most successful overseas
market". President Group, a food manufacturer and distributor from Taiwan, has been a long-time
business partner for Kirin's investments in Taiwan. President produces beverages, instant noodles,
dairy food, frozen food and edible oil. Among other things, President also represents Tropicana Juice
and Seven-Eleven convenient stores in Taiwan.
13 Source: Kirin Brewery Company, Limited Annual Report 1996
14 US$ = V133.45
Contract Brewery
Kirin's first attempt to market beer in China was accomplished through the so-called contract brewery
arrangement. Under such arrangement, a local brewery was contracted to brew Kirin-brand beer based
on an agreed price and a recipe provided by Kirin. Since existing brewing facility was used for such
production, Kirin was able to introduce their beer to the China market in a very short time after the
contract was signed. In May 1996, China Resources Snowflake Brewery in Shenyang began to
produce Kirin Beer in China. Kirin opened its sales office in Beijing in June and started selling
Shenyang-brewed Kirin beer in northern China in July. Two months later, Kirin beer was shipped to
southern China to be sold in Shanghai and Guangdong.
Besides being able to bring the product to the market in a short time, the contract brewery arrangement
also has the advantage of requiring very little technical supervision. Only one production engineer was
sent from Kirin Tokyo to Shenyang for quality control purposes. The author was also reassured that
Kirin beer produced by the contract brewery "tastes no different than the beer produced by Kirin
brewery itself." The major trade-off for contract brewery is then the lack of control in production costs,
production volume and delivery time.
2.2.2 Acquiring a Brewery
A Promising Acquisition
When Kirin was ready for their longer-term investment in China, they decided to acquire an existing
brewery instead of constructing a new one or getting involved in another contract brewery deal.
Together with their business partner, President Group from Taiwan, they did their careful investigation
and selected a local brewery in Zhuhai, a city in Guangdong Province. The brewery was chosen partly
because it was profitable and well managed, and partly because it was located in southern China where
Kirin wanted to set up their next base in China. After identifying the acquisition target, they negotiated
with the local government who owned the brewery to finalize prices and to set conditions for the
acquisition. They subsequently took over the entire operation of the existing brewery in November
1996 and became the new owner overnight. The new business entity, Zhuhai Kirin President Brewery
Co., Ltd. (ZKPB) was a wholly-owned foreign direct investment worth 50 million RMB. Kirin owned
60% of ZKPB, President owned the balance 40%.
The obvious advantage of an acquisition like this is its low business risk. Since the existing brewery
had been well managed and profitable, the business risk of the investment was exceptionally low.
Besides having the production facilities, the distribution channel and the customer base all in place, the
investment also took over all the employees and the management team that was found to be quite
competent. The local government made some good revenues from the sales and would continue to
collect income from the new owner through taxation. They also set the condition that requires Kirin to
retain most of the existing employees of the brewery.
A Complementary Partnership
Kirin recognized China's potentially large market from their market research and their prior experience
with contract brewery. They brought their brewing formula with them and contributed technology and
experience in brewery operation. They also intended to use the investment as a test case for their
bigger plan for China and the rest of the world.
However, Kirin was new in China and knew very little about the local business environment. Their
partnership with the President Group played an important role in the acquisition and the subsequent
management of the brewery. President was an experienced investor in China. They knew the local
market well because they had learned their lessons from their other businesses in China, and they had
good access to distribution, marketing and bureaucratic channels. Being an overseas Chinese company,
they also brought their language and cultural advantages to the partnership.
Beer Production
Under the new ownership, the brewery continued to produce and market the existing brand, Haizhu
beer, using the old production facility. Meanwhile, Kirin began a two-year construction plan to build a
new production line for the production of the Kirin brand. The new production line was required both
to improve quality and to increase capacity. When the author visited Tokyo in April 1998 to interview
Mr. Hiroshi Fujikawa and Mr. Akihide Toda, both assistant managers of Kirin International, the new
facility in ZKPB had just begun production.
2.2.3 Problems and Challenges
Excess Labor
The first thing Kirin did after taking over the brewery was to fire all the existing employees and re-hire
most of them under the new ownership based on new employment terms, as agreed with the local
government. As in the case of many other enterprises in China, there was substantial excess labor in
the brewery under the old government owner. Although Kirin intended to reduce the workforce by
more than 30% to achieve the ideal efficiency, they were only allowed to eliminate approximately 100
jobs in the brewery, reducing the employee headcount from the original 700 to around 600. "We still
wish to reduce the workforce even further to around 500, and hopefully we will find a way to do that
soon," said Fujikawa. It was not clear how Kirin decided whom among the 700 original employees to
layoff. However, most of the executives from the top management were asked to leave.
Targeting Market Share
Besides the excess labor, Kirin's was also quite concerned about the potential market share they could
capture once they introduce Kirin aggressively from their new production line. The beer market in
China is very fragmented and very local. There are more than 600 breweries in the country, the largest
has only 4% share of the national market. Most breweries produce for their local markets, but foreign
brands like Blue Ribbon, St. Miguel, Budweiser and Carlsberg are distributed nationwide.
"Currently, most foreign breweries focus on sales volume instead of profitability," said Toda, "and we
may have to follow suit until we gain enough market share." Although the old Haizhu brand produced
by the brewery had been successful in the past, the old management might not have the capability or
the experience to repeat the same success with the Kirin brand since the target of the new venture is the
much bigger national market.
2.2.4 Management Reorganization
New Leadership, Old Management
Executives from Kirin and President replaced 13 out of the original 55 managers and supervisors after
taking over the old brewery. The new General Manager was an expatriate from Kirin whereas the
Deputy General Manager was from the President Group. Eleven other managers posted from Tokyo or
Taipei took over key management positions for finance, business development and production. Forty-
two managers and supervisors from the original brewery were allowed to remain in the new
management team.
The new brewery was going to introduce a better product to a much larger market under a new
ownership. It is therefore understandable that some new decision-makers were needed at the top
management to resume control, make financial plans and devise new market strategies. However, most
of the mid- and junior-level managers and supervisors from the old brewery were allowed to remain in
their old positions and continue to manage the production operation. "We knew from the business
performance of the original brewery that the old management and other employees have been doing a
good job, and we wanted to let them continue doing that," explained Toda. "After all, we decided to
acquire a healthy firm in the first place so that we can be productive and profitable from day one."
Expatriate Managers
A total of eight expatriate managers were sent from Japan to ZKPB, and all of them were originally
Kirin's employees in Japan. Unlike the managers sent by the President Group from Taiwan, managers
from Kirin must attend one year of intensive cultural and language courses in China before their
postings to Zhuhai. As a result of the training, all Japanese expatriates at ZKPB were familiar with
Chinese culture and were able to communicate quite fluently in Chinese. "Learning Chinese culture is
not difficult for them because of the similarities between Japanese and Chinese cultures," said Toda.
"Furthermore, most of them could understand some written Chinese even before the training because
Chinese characters, or kanji, are used in Japanese. Learning to speak is probably the most challenging
part, and that is why they were trained in China so that they could have plenty of chances to practice."
According to the interviewees, expatriate managers at ZKPB and the local managers were on the same
pay scales, which was three to four times more than the average local pay. However, Japanese and
Taiwanese managers continued to draw salaries from the payrolls in their home countries, and received
special allowances on top of that for their overseas assignments. Since the cost of living was low in
Zhuhai and there were much fewer opportunities for the expatriate managers to spend their income
compared to Tokyo and Taipei, most of them managed to accumulate a small wealth at the end of their
expatriate contracts. "Young managers are especially eager to go to Zhuhai because it is a good
opportunity to save a considerable sum of money and to gain some overseas experience. Such
experience will help in their future career," said Fujikawa.
2.2.5 Conclusion
Kirin and President were able to complement each other well in an overseas investment by sharing
production technology, operating experience, language and cultural advantages and local business
network. They adopted a seemingly good risk-reduction strategy by investing in a profitable firm with
proven track record. They chose not to have a local partner so as to avoid unnecessary transactions
costs arise from the "same bed, different dreams" phenomenon found in most Sino-foreign joint
ventures. They also avoided the need for expensive recruitment and training by retaining the existing
management and production workforce. They did have some costly expatriate managers, but their
headcount was kept to a minimum. The expatriate managers were there to lead the existing
management to penetrate a larger market. They were also there to transfer new production technology
and business skills based on better products to be produced by a new brewing facility. The long-term
objective was to expand and localize the management further in the future as business expands.
Unfortunately, both Mr. Toda and Mr. Fujikawa were not directly involved in the acquisition or
operation of ZKPB, and therefore not able to provide the author with in-depth information. It would be
interesting and academically rewarding if a visit could be made to interview both the expatriate and
local managers on site at ZKPB to find out how well they work together after the launch of the new
production facility.
2.3 Let's Talk as a Family - The Overseas Chinese Model
The overseas Chinese investors are by far the most significant driving force behind the economic
development of China. They come from Taiwan", Hong Kong (which was considered "overseas" until
recently), Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and other parts of the "Bamboo Network" of the world. Their
businesses in China ranges from Coca-Cola bottling and highway construction to township and village
enterprises (TVE) that put together sneakers and Christmas trinkets, and they are often regarded as the
most successful investors in China. This section examines three overseas Chinese companies and their
managerial HR strategies.
2.3.1 Case Background
The CP Group
The Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group is an overseas Chinese conglomerate with its home base in
Bangkok, Thailand. They were established in 1921 as a supplier of animal feed and vegetable seeds,
but have since diversified into a wide variety of other industries. Agro-industry business still formed
the core of the group's businesses today, but their investments in more than twenty countries
worldwide include real estate, petrochemicals, finance, telecommunications, beer brewery,
international trading, pharmaceutical, supermarket chains, restaurants and motorcycle manufacturing.
CP's total asset in 1997 was estimated to be US$ 8 billions6 .
1 Few Chinese from the Republic of China (Taiwan) would consider themselves overseas Chinese ("hua-
chiau"). However, for convenient reference, "overseas Chinese" is defined in this thesis as ethnic Chinese people
who are not citizens of People's Republic of China (PRC). The author apologizes to the readers who find this
definition politically offensive.
16 Source : James Mulvenon (editor), China Facts & Figures Annual, Volume 21, Academic International Press,
1997
In 1979, CP established their first company in China, responding to Deng Xiaoping's reform and open
door policy. In fact, they formed the first Sino-foreign joint venture to participate in the Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone in Guangdong province, and they pride themselves on having a business
license with a "001" serial number. Today, CP is one of the largest and most influential foreign
investors in China. As a result, CP's dynamic Chairman, Mr. Dhanin Chearavanont, has become "one
of a select group of overseas Chinese businessmen who are regularly consulted on business and
political affairs by Chinese leaders."17
Under the names of their main holding companies, Zhengda Holding and Bofeng International, CP
owns more than a 160 wholly-own and joint-venture companies in 28 out of 31 provinces in China 8 .
CP's business in China focuses on agro-industry although they have also diversified into
telecommunications, real estate, beer production and motorcycle manufacturing in recent years. A
Salomon Brothers' analyst report dated May 1995 estimated that CP's agri-businesses in China would
contribute more than 40% of the group's worldwide earning by 1996.
CP hires hundreds of managers to manage their business empire in China. Their managerial human
resource policies are determined by the structure of their joint ventures, their business strategy to
integrate both vertically and horizontally, and their corporate policy to be highly localized.
Partnership Structure
Although the current trend of investment in China favors 100% ownership, CP's strength in China lies
in their ability and experience in managing strategic joint ventures with local partners. Depending on
the investment constraints of the local authority and other local conditions, CP's investments in China
usually take the form of either one of the two JV models commonly found in China:
Equity Joint Ventures (EJV) - Under this arrangement, CP would own fifty percent of a
limited liability company while a Chinese partner, usually a company owned by the local
government, would invest in the other half. Both parties are jointly responsible for investment
and management of the JV, and have equal share of its profits and losses.
17 The Economist, November 26, 1994
1 Source : "Mr. THIRAYUT P. Senior Executive Vice President of Charoen Pokphand Group", August 29,
1997, http://www.chinarainbow.com/english/wjhz/el.html
Cooperative Joint Venture (CJV) - This form of JV is usually adopted when the local Chinese
partner is not able to contribute an equal portion of the initial investment, or not willing to
share equal economic risks. It is a business agreement similar to a BOT (build-own-transfer)
contract whereby the local government takes ownership of a company's assets after an agreed
period of time - usually 20 to 25 years in the case of most CP's feed mills under such
arrangement. CP's management has full control of a CJV company, but they are usually
obliged to transfer 15% to 20% of their operating profit to the local government in exchange of
discounted factory land, power and water supply.
Regardless of which partnership structure is adopted, CP is usually expected to bring investment
capital, manufacturing technology and management know-how to the localities they choose to invest
in. In return, the local communities would provide human resources, factory land, basic infrastructure
(access roads, water and power supply, etc.) and local market for the manufacturing output. In new
ventures where the required technologies do not reside in-house within the CP Group, CP is often able
to bring a third player into a partnership as the technology provider. For example, Honda and Heineken
provided technical assistance to CP's motorcycle and brewery joint ventures in China respectively. In
such cases, CP's skills in organizing and managing business partnership in China become invaluable to
these technology leaders who wish to establish themselves in China.
Vertical and Horizontal Integration
CP's investment strategy in China is consistent with an established model of vertical and horizontal
integration widely used in their investments in Thailand and elsewhere in the world. A CP agro-
industry investment in China usually began with a feed mill. As the firm became familiar with the
local environment, it would expand vertically forward into chicken farming, slaughterhouses, and meat
marketing; and vertically backward into chicken breeding and grain production. Subsequent horizontal
expansion would probably involve duck or swine farming, each providing a new set of vertical
integration opportunities. In fact, CP's strength in expanding through horizontal and vertical
integration allows them to demonstrate their long-term commitment in China by reinvesting most of
their operating profits within the country.
Localization
CP did not invest in China as a foreign investor, but as a local company utilizing outside capital and
technology to bring social and economic development to China. Wherever CP invests in China, they
consistently portray a strong sense of local belonging in their partnerships with the local authorities.
This is partly due to CP's overseas Chinese background and their founding philosophy of shared
prosperity, and partly because of the nature of the market for their core products. Unlike manufacturing
companies that rely on China's cheap labor to produce primarily for export markets in faraway lands,
CP's customers are local farmers and consumers in their vicinities. Not only do they rely on the
neighboring districts and villages for production manpower, factory land, raw materials and other input
factors, they also sell their products to farms and consumers in the same localities. Localization is
therefore a very important characteristic of CP's operation in China.
Another compelling factor that drives CP to become close alliances of their localities is the fact that
many of their major competitors in agro-industry are local Chinese producers. These local firms often
capitalize on the nationalistic sentiment of their customers and solicit local support by insinuating a
foreign-profiteer image to CP's investments. CP knows very well that the closer they can identify
themselves with the local communities, the better they can preemptively displace such claims by their
local competitors. While describing a JV with the Jilin provincial government, Mr.Thirayut Phitya-
Isarakul, President of CP Group in China, emphasized the "Three Benefits" principle CP has for their
investments in China: Benefit to the nation, benefit to the people and, only lastly, benefit to the
company.'9 "The government leaders and the business partners around China have accepted us,
welcomed us, and treated us as good friends instead of outsider," said Mr. Thirayut.
Gao Qiu Golf Resort
Mr. David Chen had no idea what exactly he was getting into when two close friends, one from Hong
Kong, another from Taiwan, asked him to help manage a golf resort project in Southern China. He
accepted the challenge anyway since he had been retired for a while and found it a little boring staying
at home in San Francisco. Besides, his friends insisted that he was their "only hope" in salvaging their
investment.
19 "Mr. THIRAYUT P. Senior Executive Vice President of Charoen Pokphand Group", August 29, 1997,
http://www.chinarainbow.com/english/wjhz/el.htmi
The investment Mr. Chen was assigned to salvage was a real-estate project to build and operate a
luxurious golf resort in the suburb of a provincial capital in Southern China. The project was conceived
and launched in 1992 when foreign investors flocked to Southern China after Deng Xiaoping's
legendary visit to the South. The much-discussed direct air link with Taiwan and the potential
economic boom in the region that would follow also contributed to the optimism in the project. The
multiple-phase project covered a total land area of 600 hectares near the city. The total investment
would eventually amount to more than US$50 million, financed entirely by funds from Hong Kong
and Taiwan. The whole proposal included a golf course, 600 luxurious bungalows, a 200-unit
apartment building, a community center, a sport and recreational zone, a resort hotel, and all the
associated earthworks, access roads and infrastructure. The target customers of the resort were
expatriate executives who worked and lived in the provincial capital.
Mr. Chen was trained as a civil engineer and had more than twenty years of experience in construction
project management. The Taiwanese construction firm he worked for sent him to Singapore as a
general manager in the early 80's when they began to expand globally. Mr. Chen subsequently worked
for many years in Singapore for several other construction firms, managing large-scale housing
projects for both the government and the private sectors. He eventually returned to Taiwan to become
the Chairman of a construction company before he retired in 1990.
When it was launched in 1992, the first phase of the project, which included the golf course, 60
bungalows and the support infrastructure, was expected to complete in eighteen months. Mr. Chen
arrived at the project site as the project's Vice President and a fully authorized representative of the
board of directors in 1993. By that time, Phase One had been going on for more than one year, but
leveling of the golf course was only half-done. The rest of the construction work was nowhere near
completion.
Chia Hsin Company
Chia Hsin Company, a Taiwanese conglomerate, started their first investment in China in 1994.
Between April 1994 and December 1997, they established nine companies in Shanghai and its vicinity
with a total investment of US$550 millions. The largest among these investments is a US$280-million
cement production plant built in 1995 near Jiangsu Province. Other Chia Hsin companies in China are
firms involved primarily in cement production, trading and distribution. Chia Hsin's cement production
facilities in China have a total capacity to produce 1.2 million tons of cement per year. Half of the
cement they produced in 1997 was sold in the domestic Chinese market, while the balance was
exported back to Taiwan. In 1998, Chia Hsin's cement business has been severely affected by the
economic downturn in Asia. As infrastructure and housing constructions were being cut back in most
developing Asian countries, Chia Hsin saw cement price plummeted from the 1997-peak of $43 per
ton to as low as $25 per ton in 1998.
Out of the nine Chia Hsin companies in China, Chia Hsin wholly owns three of them, whereas the rest
are joint ventures with Chia Hsin having 22.5% to 80% share. Some of these JVs have as many as four
partners. A total of 1,240 employees are hired by these companies, out of which 105 are managers.
According to Mr. Dylan Chang, Vice President of Chia Hsin Company in China, the joint venture
contracts of all but one of the companies stipulated that Chia Hsin has the right to make hiring
decisions for all the managerial positions in these companies.
Among Chia Hsin's 105 managers in China, 75 of them are expatriate managers, and all of them are
overseas Chinese. Furthermore, most of the expatriate managers are originally employees of Chia
Hsin's operation in Taiwan. While expatriate managers manage the more strategic functions in the
group e.g. finance, marketing and business development, most of the local managers are entrusted with
operation related tasks.
2.3.2 Problem and Challenges
This section describes some of the difficulties the firms above face in managing their management in
China, and the sources and consequences of some of these difficulties.
Cronyism and Nepotism
The case of Gao Qiu Golf Resort illustrates how misplaced trust on the investor's part can result in
disastrous total mismanagement. After Mr. Chen's inspection of the project site, he was shocked to
discover how much had gone wrong. Not only was construction work of the bungalows not up to the
expected quality standard, basic specifications of most structural and foundation works were done
wrong back at the design stage. Mr. Chen finally had no choice but to suspend construction for more
than three months so that he could go back to the drafting table and reworked the structural design. He
then spent the next three months managing remedial works to rectify the wrongly constructed
structures.
According to Mr. Chen, the root of the problem was personnel mismanagement. The project hired 60
management and administrative staff members then, in addition to 300 construction site workers.
Under the General Manager of the project, there were managerial and supervisory positions for
procurement, sales and marketing, engineering, quality control, accounting and general administration.
"In my opinion, none of the managers at that time was qualified for his or her job," said Mr. Chen.
Mr. Lee, the General Manager appointed by the project investors, was a retired senior cadre from the
city government. He was chosen by the board of directors to manage the project mainly because of his
strong influence in the local government. He also appeared to be a resourceful person who knew where
to recruit the right people and identify the suitable contractors for the project. The investors were not
familiar with the local business environment. They therefore thought their best bet was to let someone
with an extensive local network manage their investment.
The problem started when Lee began to fill literally all the managerial and key supervisory positions of
the project with his ex-subordinates and close friends. "Not only did Lee and his managers not have
the proper professional qualification and experience to carry out their duties, they did not know how
and where to hire the right people," said Mr. Chen. In Mr. Chen's words, most of the managers "used
their imagination" to determine how to run the project. On top of that, they took advantage of their
positions to channel economic benefits to their families and friends. "I had no way to prove it, but I
suspect some key managers actually owned some of the subcontractor companies of the project," said
Mr. Chen. All these led to extensive conflicts of interest and prolonged work delay. Obstacles to
smooth progress, be it legal, administrative or technical, appeared frequently, and the management
kept demanding additional funds to be used to "expedite progress". In the end, the investors had no
way of telling how much of the delay was inflicted internally.
Chia Hsin faces similar problems, too. "As a foreign JV partner in China, you somehow have to always
keep an eye on the managers appointed by your Chinese partner," said Mr. Dylan Chang. "This is my
major concern with the local Chinese managers. They somehow cannot appreciate the fact that a firm
has to prosper as a single entity. They are there to maximize the benefits of the Chinese partners, not
the benefits of the company as a whole. To us, these managers are 'their people' whom we don't trust."
However, since CP and Chia Hsin are both long-time investors in China, their HR policies have been
designed to discourage cronyism, as we will discuss in section 2.3.4.
Brain Drain and Retention
Like other investors in China, overseas Chinese firms do lose their managers, too. In the case of CP,
for example, despite generous compensations and attractive career prospect, they still loses 5% to 10%
of their key managers every year. Mr. Nirun mentioned cases in which ex-managers of the group set up
competing mills using the production technology and management skills they learned while working
for CP. "Fortunately, they are not a major threat to us at this point," said Mr. Nirun. "Consistency in
quality is critical in our business, and they are not experienced enough to avoid quality fluctuation yet.
Furthermore, our brand name is what our customers trust. They are unlikely to switch brand and risk
their entire chicken stocks for slightly lower prices." Nevertheless, the potential of losing good
managers to competition will remain a serious HR issue CP's top management in Beijing has to
cautiously deal with.
Difficulty in Expulsion
No matter how much effort they spend on identifying the right managers, companies in China do make
mistakes in their hiring processes. Every now and then, they may find under their payroll managers
who either fail to perform to expectation, or are too difficult to train. However, firing an employee is
not an easy task in China, no matter how legitimate a case the employer has. Employees are
accustomed to lifetime employment and all-encompassing social welfare provided by state-owned
employers under the old command economy. Although such expectation is gradually being removed
under the recent economic reform, laying off employees in most localities outside the more "reformed"
cities is still socially unacceptable, if not illegal.
As a good corporate citizen and trusted partner, CP, for example, has been quite reluctant to upset the
local communities and their Chinese partners with labor disputes. "All we can do to managers who
don't perform is to transfer them to some redundant and obscure positions," said Mr. Nirun. "And we
are not even supposed to reduce their salaries. By doing so, we hope they would get the message and
resign on their own. Sometimes they do leave when they find better jobs, but there is nothing much we
can do if they decide to stay on."
Sometimes, the no-layoff condition can take on a different and more personal form. When faced with
the incompetent management team at the golf resort, the first solution that came to Mr. Chen's mind
was to fire all the non-performing managers. However, he later realized that was next to impossible.
Almost all the key personnel were related to Lee, the General Manager, in one way or another.
Offending Lee in any way was undesirable because of his influence in the local government. The
personal relationship among Lee and some of the managers of the projects dated back to the Cultural
Revolution20 period when they went through wave after wave of political movement together. For this
reason, he felt obliged to "take care" of them when he was capable of doing so. "Some of these people
spent years in the same prison cell together, and they became even closer than family. It is very
difficult for an outsider to understand the strong ties among them - it took me more than two years to
truly appreciate how deep such 'comrade love' and 'revolution attachment' are," said Mr. Chen. "Once
you have such strong relationship in the management team, people start to cover up each other's
mistakes and, sooner or later, begin to exploit such relationship for personal gains at the company's
expense. That was how the whole operation became corrupt and unprofessional."
Territory Disputes
Besides the more "generic" problems discussed above, CP also faces a rather unique HR problem that
involves territory disputes among their managers. As CP proliferates more districts and provinces in
China, market territories began to overlap. As a result, they sometimes find it difficult to prevent some
of the more ambitious sales managers from expanding their business too far. On the one hand, CP
wants their managers to be aggressive in securing market share. On the other hand, they knew their
limited management resources could be better utilized than being wasted on market cannibalization.
Furthermore, not allowing their managers to compete freely is against what they were taught to do in
free market economy, and that creates disincentives among some of the more enterprising managers.
The fact that the JV partners of these feed mills are often different and competing commercial or
political entities further aggravates this problem. The eight CP regional offices in China are actively
involved in resolving territory disputes among feed mills.
20 The Cultural Revolution is mass campaign started by Chairman Mao in 1966 to revitalize the nation's
revolutionary fervor and renew its basic institutions. Allied with the army, young revolutionary Red Guards
attacked so-called bourgeois elements in cultural circles and in the bureaucracy. The movement lasted for a
decade and resulted in widespread disorder and violence. Many people were killed and tortured.
2.3.3 Hiring Options
This section looks at the different options CP, Chia Hsin and Gao Qiu have while hiring managers in
China.
Expatriate Managers
An obvious solution to overcome the short supply of local managers is the hiring of expatriate
managers. Mr. Chen's appointment to his position at Gao Qiu is clearly a case in point. Mr. Chen in
turn hired a supervisor from Taiwan when he failed to find a suitable candidate locally. CP and Chia
Hsin also hire a substantial number of expatriate managers for their operations in China. In fact, CP
has some very specific HR policies (see section 2.3.4 below) that often force them to import key
managers to their new feed mills. During their early years in China when qualified managers were
difficult to find locally, all of these key managers were overseas Chinese from Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and other South East Asian countries. These were usually experienced
managers transferred from other established factories, or capable senior employees promoted to lead a
new partnership.
Although expatriate managers may import the skills and experiences essential to some managerial
positions, they are not always the best choice. In Mr. Chen's opinion, the greatest drawback of
expatriate managers is their inability to manage from the Chinese perspective. China is still at the very
early stage of internationalization. Therefore, most employees are relatively ignorant about the outside
world and the concepts of market economy. As a result, business practices taken for granted in other
countries are often not the norms in China. If an expatriate manager fails to recognize this
circumstance, he is most likely to be frustrated and fail. In order to do his/her job well, a good
expatriate manager should be sensitive to the local business environment and try to adjust his
management style and expectation to accommodate it.
"Good communication skills, a thorough understanding of the local business culture, and a great deal
of patience are what a good expatriate managers should bring with him to the job," said Mr. Chen.
"Unfortunately, too many expatriate managers had tried to impose western management theories in
China without recognizing the fact that it is impossible to undo fifty years of socialist rule overnight."
Overseas Chinese
Not surprisingly, expatriate managers in CP, Chia Hsin and Gao Qiu are all ethnic Chinese. To these
firms, hiring non-Chinese expatriates is apparently not an option. "We have more than seventy
expatriate managers from all over the world, including some from New Zealand and the United States.
However, all of them are overseas Chinese who speak Chinese and have Chinese cultural background.
They might have grown up in some Chinatowns in the West somewhere, but they are still Chinese,"
said Dylan Chang of Chia Hsin. In fact, it makes sense for overseas Chinese firms to hire only ethnic
Chinese managers for China. Sharing the same language and culture, they can communicate effectively
with both the Chinese employees and the overseas Chinese owners. Unlike non-Chinese expatriates
who become literally illiterate when they get to China, overseas Chinese expatriates also have the
valuable language advantage in daily business dealings.
Mr. Chang of Chia Hsin quoted trust as another major factor of hiring overseas Chinese manager from
home. "For the managers we send from Taiwan, we know their background well and we can therefore
trust them better. Some of them have worked for us for many years and we know they always have the
benefits of the company in mind. On the other hand, we often know very little about the people we hire
locally in China, and we simply can't trust them as much." Chia Hsin therefore prefers to have
overseas Chinese managers from Taiwan for some key managerial positions even though they cost
much more than local managers.
However, Mr. Chen has his caveat on overseas Chinese expatriates, and he believes they are not
necessarily the best managers in China. He observed that they may have the language and cultural
advantages compared to American and European expatriates, but their management style tends to be
problem-oriented. In other words, they focus their efforts on solving short-term problems at hand by
taking advantage of their ability to understand the local employees better. However, most of them
received their management training by rising through the ranks after many years of learning on the job.
Although they have vast experience they can draw upon to solve operation and administrative
problems, they lack the analytical skills and professional knowledge most western managers learned in
formal business education. As a result, they often lose sight of the long-term outlook of the business
and fail to get to the root issues of management problems. In Mr. Chen's opinion, many of them turned
out to be poor managers for businesses that required long-term visions and big-picture thinking.
Local Managers
More so than the western and Japanese enterprises, overseas Chinese firms find that they need to
localize their management in order to be cost effective in China. Despite high salaries and generous
fringe benefits, CP, for example, still finds it difficult to recruit expatriate managers for their feed mills
in China. This is partly due to the rapid growth of their business, and partly due to the critical shortage
of management talent in China and in Asia as a whole. Professional managers with good language skill
and business experience have become a scarce resource amidst the Asian economic boom in the late
80's and the 90's. Furthermore, better-qualified managers from Hong Kong, Taipei and South East
Asia usually prefer the more convenient and glamorous lifestyle in other Asian cities (e.g. Singapore,
Hong Kong, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur) to the relative backwardness of China.
Faced with increasing difficulty and ever growing costs to hire expatriate managers, CP began to look
for substitutes in the local HR market in the early 90's. They do so by hiring graduates from the
economics departments and business schools of local universities throughout the countries. "These
local graduates are eager to work for us because the salary we pay is ten times more than what they can
command from local Chinese employers," explain Mr. Nirun Changwatchai, a Vice President from
CP's Bangkok head office, while discussing with the author in fluent Mandarin. "But to us this is still
an attractive option because they still cost much less than the expatriate managers."
As western-styled business and management programs were introduced into more universities and
vocational schools in China, more local managers were recruited into CP's pool of key managers.
Compared to expatriate managers, CP feels that their local managers are more loyal to the firm
because, unlike the expatriates, they are unlikely to get job offers from outside China. Furthermore,
since they are less competent in English, they are also less likely to become headhunting targets of
foreign multinationals investing in China. However, unlike expatriate managers, key managers hired
locally by CP do have to go through additional training before they are put on the job.
Gao Qiu Golf Resort needed to hire managers locally for the same cost reason, too. Mr. Chen tried
several times to recruit managers, supervisors and engineers locally and from nearby provinces, but he
was not too successful. However, due to his substantial recruitment efforts, he had the opportunities to
meet graduates from many local universities and has therefore gained a good understanding of their
backgrounds and capabilities. Following are some of his observations and opinions.
Quality of Management Training
First of all, Mr. Chen feels that a large part of the problem lies with the quality of the faculty in many
Chinese universities. Many of the instructors in these universities were in their 40's, and they belong to
a generation who received their university education during the Cultural Revolution period. A lot of
students were admitted to universities and granted university degrees then based on their good political
background rather than their academic accomplishments. Furthermore, most of the qualified and
experienced professors in the universities were sent to rural villages during that period for "education
through labor." There were virtually no good teachers in these institutions then even if the students
were good. Later, many of these graduates with questionable academic credential became faculty
members in local universities and they taught new generations of university students. Consequently,
students taught by these faculty members were not able to learn the proper skills from the professors.
That in turn has a negative impact on the quality of subsequent batches of university graduates.
The peculiar historical factor discussed above was highlighted when Peking University, the oldest
university in China, celebrated its 10 0 th anniversary recently. During a celebration gathering organized
by P.U. alumni in the New England area, alumni representing different decades in the history of the
university went up to the stage to share their P.U. memories with the audience. While alumni from
others decades recounted invaluable intellectual experiences and inspiring professors, an alumnae who
attend P.U. in the early 70's talked about something very different. She recalled how she and her
classmates laid every brick of the library, dug a pit on campus to build a swimming pool, and labored
to construct other facilities for the school. "Our experience as university students is quite different
from what the rest of you experienced," she told the audience.
In Mr. Chen's opinion, the quality problem is most severe in the business and management fields.
Subjects like Civil Engineering and Mechanical Engineering are least affected because the basic
technologies haven't changed much in the past decades. Therefore, what the older generations of
professors learned from the Soviet Union is still relevant and applicable to a large extent. On the other
hand, new fields like computer sciences and biotechnology are so new that no individual can pretend to
have expertise in those fields and teach such courses in universities without the proper credential. The
most affected are therefore "soft sciences" like business strategies, finance theories, legal procedures,
insurance, marketing, international relations, business communications and other business and
management subjects taught in a typical MBA program. Since many of the instructors of these courses
were trained in the old centrally planned and command economy, they often do not have a good
understanding of how modem market economy functions. However, due to the subjective nature of
these subject matters, faculty members can easily form their own opinions by drawing upon the limited
amount of relevant literature they have access to, adding their personal experiences from the old
economy to it, and blending them with their imagination of how modem market economy works. This
is reflected in the quality of the management candidates Mr. Chen interviewed. "Without a good
understanding and appreciation of how the global economy functions, many instructors impart the
wrong knowledge and attitude to their students. To me, this is the most destructive and dangerous
thing that is happening to China's economic reform. Without the proper business and management
mindset, Chinese managers will never be able to manage a world-class economy," said Mr. Chen.
Mr. Chen illustrated his point with an example: "When I asked the General Manager to come up with
some incentives to speed up the leveling of the golf course, he put up dozens of loudspeakers on the
golf course and blared patriotic songs and music from the revolution era while the workers worked. To
him, that was the best way to boost morale."
Mr. Chen has also observed another inherent problem with the Chinese education system - extreme
specialization. University students are assigned to very specialized academic departments and spend
their entire college years studying very narrow fields in great details. In fact, some of the colleges are
in themselves very specialized. For example, there is a Tourism College and a Petroleum University.
Even in an engineering school, a student would graduate with an undergraduate degree in combustion
engine design instead of a degree in mechanical engineering. This education model worked in the
planned economy because university graduates were immediately assigned to very specific positions
and would most likely spend the rest of their career carrying out the same job functions. Since their
careers were pre-planned by the state and job mobility was restricted, most workers had neither the
means nor the incentive to be flexible in their skills. This education model certainly doesn't produce
good managers for the reformed economy. A manager in a market economy is expected to be a well-
rounded and adaptable individual with broad business and social knowledge.
Location Factor
"Due to the immobility of Chinese employees, companies located in different places in China face
different problems in their attempts to hire local managers," said Mr. Chen. Most Taiwanese and Hong
Kong investments in China concentrate in the Southern provinces. These smaller companies usually
find it more difficult, if not impossible, to hire good professional managers due to their physical
distances from major cities like Beijing and Shanghai. Larger cities tend to have better universities that
attract faculty and students with better talent. "American and European multinationals in Beijing and
Shanghai can at least try to recruit from several leading universities in these cities. For those of us who
tried to hire in smaller cities in the southern provinces, the pool of candidates we had access to were
not quite as good even though we may receive a lot of applications," said Mr. Chen. "Chinese MBA
students you met at Sloan and other top management programs in the U.S. and China are not the
typical management caliber you see in everyday China," Mr. Chen reminded the author. "Those who
make it to the top MBA programs are survivors from the toughest competition and they would do well
even if they don't have their MBA degrees. Managers at that level are hard to come by in China,
especially when one is outside the few major cities."
Demand Factor
Difficulty in hiring good professional managers due to their disadvantageous locations was not too big
a problem for Hong Kong and Taiwanese enterprises when they first migrated to southern China in the
80's. Most of the overseas Chinese ventures then were involved in labor intensive light industries that
took advantage of the low operating costs in China. "Many of them were managed as family
businesses, and you often see an entire family moving from Taiwan or Hong Kong to China so that
they have enough hands to manage an export oriented manufacturing operation," said Mr. Chen. "For
labor intensive operations in those days, good management skills were not essential. They based their
operations on their experiences in Taiwan or Hong Kong, and slowly adapted in China through trial
and error." However, as operations in China became more expensive in recent years, and as Taiwanese
and Hong Kong enterprises began to move upmarket to management intensive hi-tech and value-added
industries, the demand for good professional managers by these firms began to grow. That worsens the
supply shortage in the already competitive labor market in places where these firms are found.
Loyalty and Retention
Retention is yet another problem faced by smaller overseas Chinese firms. "For a small company like
ours, identifying a qualified candidate in the recruitment process is not the end of the story," said Mr.
Chen. Many highly qualified candidates use smaller overseas Chinese joint ventures as stepping-stones
to managerial positions in large western firms. Potential employers like Mr. Chen have to do their best
to identify and avoid these candidates. For example, Mr. Chen once interviewed a very promising
candidate for a supervisory position in the engineering department. However, it was very clear that he
wanted the job so that his rural residence permit ("hu-kou")21 can be upgraded to a city residence
permit, and that he would start looking for job in a bigger company once he became a legitimate city
dweller. "We had to forgo candidates like that since we did not expect them to stay long."
The issue of residence permit, or hu-kou, is less of a problem today than in the early 90's. Like many
rules and regulations introduced by the Chinese Communist Party decades ago, laws that restrict labor
mobility are still there but are less strictly enforced after the economic reform. Nevertheless,
managerial candidates who are not qualified or confident enough to join a western firm may still use
small overseas Chinese firms as their "training schools", and will move on as soon as they think they
are ready for their ideal jobs.
After adding all the above-mentioned factors together, hiring good local managers for smaller firms
outside the major cities became extremely difficult. Mr. Chen had an experience of interviewing more
than seventy candidates and still failed to identify the right employee for a single supervisory position.
Borrowed Managers
In China, one rather common way to hire managers is to "borrow" them from state-owned enterprises
based on temporary transfer contracts. Such arrangements, known as jieyong or jiediao in Chinese,
were originally introduced among SOEs to provide allocation flexibility in an otherwise rigid labor
system. Once a suitable candidate is identified in an SOE, the potential employer can request to
"borrow" the candidate for up to five years. The contracts for such arrangement are negotiated on a
case-by-case basis, and they are usually renewable every year. Almost in all cases, the private
company has to pay a higher salary than what the employee originally earns in the SOE. On top of that,
the private-sector employer also has to pay the SOE concerned a monthly fee no less than the original
salary of the employee, supposedly to compensate the SOE for its lost productivity.
21 The residence permit system is a comprehensive system of residence and employment control introduced in the
early 60's. It was used to remove surplus population from China's towns and cities. A complete household
registration system was established and strictly enforced in urban neighborhoods to ration foodstuffs and other
daily necessities. Illegal migrants to the cities would thus have to return to the villages for not having the right to
purchase food in the cities. In rural areas, the same system used food rationing to tie peasants to the land. Most
In general, SOEs are happy to get into such arrangements because this is a good way to earn extra
income from their redundant workforce. The SOEs concerned gain twice - by collecting extra revenues
and by not having to pay some employees to whom they have no work to assign anyway. The
employees are happy, too. Not only do they earn higher salary, they also get to keep the social welfare
benefits associated with SOEs by keeping their personnel files with the state personnel system.
Besides, for those who are willing and eager to learn new skills, working outside their original SOE
units gives them good exposure to the competitive business environment.
Mr. Chen of Gao Qiu managed to borrow an architect, a civil engineer and a mechanical engineer from
a local SOE to supervise the construction of the golf resort. Although he was very satisfied with the
quality of the managers he borrowed, the borrowing arrangement itself turned out to be an unpleasant
experience for Mr. Chen. "We only needed to use the three managers for half a year, but at the end of
the sixth months, I was arm-twisted into keep the managers longer and continued to pay their fees and
salaries. I managed to find them enough work to do for another eighteen months until construction
completed and I was about to return to San Francisco. When I tried to "return" these managers again,
the SOE concerned threatened to take legal action against us on the ground that we were obliged to
keep those managers indefinitely since we did not specify the borrowing duration up front." To Mr.
Chen, that incident showed how desperate some SOEs were in getting rid of their excess workforce,
albeit temporarily.
2.3.4 Policies and Strategies
This section investigates some major HR policies CP, Chia Hsin and Gao Qiu use to address their
managerial recruitment challenges based on the hiring options discussed above.
Control Mechanism
After doing business in China for a period of time, firms would have learned valuable lessons from
their experiences in hiring managers for their Chinese operations. Many of them introduce specific HR
policies for the unique challenges in China, and they usually update these policies as and when the
people thus lived with their rural or urban statuses acquired at birth.
local conditions change. Many of these policies take the form of control measures that preempt some
potential HR problems common found in China.
Due to their long history in China, CP appears to have the most systematic and most effective HR
policies for China among the three overseas Chinese firms we are studying. Their feed mills in China
usually hire workers locally through local employment agencies, and they usually let their Chinese
partners decide who to employ. However, CP always insists on appointing four key managerial
positions on their own in every joint venture. These positions are General Manager, Financial
Controller, Sales Manager and Quality Control Manager. "These positions are critical in feed mill
business. Letting the inexperience local managers hold these positions is too great a risk for us," said
Mr. Nirun. He went on to explain that managers hired in China usually lack the market experience to
fill the first three positions mentioned above because they were trained to manage production volume
under the old planned economy, and are therefore not capable of managing based on efficiency, market
needs and profitability. As for quality control, it is crucial to the business and involves some
proprietary technology CP brings to the partnership. "How much we can sell depends on the
consistency of our quality, and that ultimately depends on our quality control. It is therefore too critical
a task to leave to the inexperience local managers," said Mr. Nirun. As long as the appointment of the
four key positions mentioned above is under the control of CP', they always let their Chinese partners
hire local candidates for other managerial posts, particularly positions for administration and
procurement. The local managers would have the cultural and language advantages required in their
liaison with the local authorities, and a local purchasing manager knows where to source for the best
raw materials at low prices.
In order to manage its large pool of key managers in more than 150 agro-industry partnerships in
China, CP has put together a set of other HR policies to control, motivate, upgrade and retain their
valuable management talent. Some of the more important policies are the following:
No local postings
As a rule, a new manager in one of the four key positions is not permitted to begin his career with CP
in his home province even though some other managerial positions are filled by individuals familiar
with the local business circle. CP had probably learned from some unpleasant experiences in the past,
and hoped to use such policy to avoid cronyism and nepotism introduced from a key manager's old
business or personal network. A new manager, bringing his management and business skills to an
unfamiliar environment, would be forced to build a new business network with the help of his new
subordinates and fellow managers. That helps create a workplace in which self-monitoring and mutual
learning prevail. A major disadvantage of this policy is that, like expatriate managers, local managers
must also be given 30 days of home leave per year, resulting in substantial productivity loss.
According to Mr. Nirun, CP has recently begun to allow some of their long-serving managers to return
to their home cities. Once these veteran managers have demonstrated their loyalty to the group, posting
them near home benefits CP by eliminating the need for extended home leaves.
Job rotation
CP does not keep a key manager in the same feed mill for more than five years. Managers are routinely
transferred to factories in different provinces so that they do not cultivate too intimate a local network
and compromise company interests through favoritism. A more positive aspect of such rotation is of
course the opportunity to expand a manager's industrial knowledge and business network. Given CP's
strength in vertical and horizontal integration, rotating their managers through a wide variety of
operating environments and job functions has become an effective means to train and motivate their
key managers.
Horizontal reporting structure
All the four key managers in a CP feed mill are at the same level of the reporting hierarchy. Instead of
having three other managers reporting to the General Manager, all of them report to their respective
regional vice presidents based in Beijing. Key managers focus on what they know best but work as a
peer team to coordinate the management of a partnership. Such horizontal reporting structure creates
balance of power at the firm level and minimizes covering up of operation faults. In fact, such check-
and-balance management style is a key characteristic of companies run by overseas Chinese
conglomerates.
Chia Hsin also has a similar set of managerial HR policies in place in response to the unique
employment market in China, but they are less formal and less comprehensive. As for Gao Qiu, since
much of their operation involved one-time construction tasks, most HR policies were introduced and
enforced ad hoc based on Mr. Chen personal experiences.
Training
Overseas Chinese firms generally do not put as much emphasis on formal training as their western
counterparts do. The author believes this is partly because their operations are usually of smaller scales
(and therefore not economical to provide formal training to a small group of managers), and partly
because they seldom involve themselves in production or manufacturing that requires specific training
in advanced technologies. Since Asian and Chinese businesses rely heavily on personal relationship,
overseas Chinese firms also have a strong tendency to advocate informal on-the-job training. A
management trainee would work closely with and learn from a more senior mentor, and he would
become a part of the mentor's career network in the process.
Due to their size and their long corporate history, CP does provide good training to all their staff,
especially their key managerial personnel. "CP always encourages their staff to learn and provides
good formal training at all levels. If you learned well, you will rise quickly within the group," said Mr.
Natwut Amornvivat, an MBA student from MIT Sloan school of Management who worked for CP's
TelecomAsia both before and between his MBA years. CP's feed mills usually provide three months
of on-the-job training for the new managers they hire in China. During this period, a new recruit would
serve an apprenticeship under one or more experienced managers in an existing feed mill. He would
learn the necessary skills, evaluate his work condition and responsibilities, and be assessed on his
business and management capabilities at the same time. According to Mr. Nirun, an average of 10-
15% of the new candidates would leave during the training period, either voluntarily or were
eliminated due to some uncorrectable weaknesses in their management skills. The remaining
candidates would be given a 30% pay rise and be transferred to their new positions anywhere in the
country where vacancies were available.
Chia Hsin, on the other hand, provides in-house training to train their managers on human resource
management, legal procedures, finance and accounting, languages (mostly basic business English),
shipping procedures, insurance, telecommunications, data processing and international trade. Their
training consists of some classroom workshops and some on-the-job learning, the duration of which
depends on individual cases.
"We teach different things to our Taiwanese and [local] Chinese candidates," said Mr. Chang. "For our
managers from Taiwan, besides the technical knowledge they need to know about China, we spend a
lot of effort to prepare them psychologically for the business and personal hardship they would face in
China. Once they know what to expect and yet decide to accept the offer [to work in China], they are
more likely to complete their overseas assignments." In fact, many Chia Hsin's managers had requested
to extend their employment contracts in China in the past, and some even decided to settle down in
China for good. As for the managers they hire locally, Chia Hsin usually trains them on basic business
and computer knowledge, and make sure they learn the proper protocol to communicate with the
Taipei head office.
Rewards and Compensations
Like their western and Japanese competitors, Overseas Chinese companies also have to use good
compensation packages to attract managers from their home countries and other parts of Asia to
manage their investments in China. In fact, the need to hire expatriate managers has always been a
heavy cost burden for these firms.
Salaries
Given the high demand for their talents in the region, expatriate managers understandably demand high
salaries or additional cash allowances to compensate for the relatively poor living condition22 in China.
Such extra monetary rewards are commonly, and aptly, known as "hardship money" in the business
circle in China. "In addition to the relatively high salaries they draw from the local partnerships, our
expatriate managers continue to receive their original pay under our payroll in Taipei. Depending on
the individual contracts negotiated, some expatriate managers also receive an additional monthly
'expatriate allowance' from Taipei," explained Mr. Chang of Chia Hsin. "Such salary structure allows
us to compensate the expatriate managers appropriately without upsetting the local salary structure in
China."
On the other hand, cost of living in China is considerably lower than many other Asian cities. With
housing and transportation expenses covered of by the employers, many young expatriate managers
from Taiwan and South East Asia find their take-home salaries increase many folds compared to what
22 Compared to some other cities popular among expatriates in Asia, cities in China are usually more polluted
and have less developed infrastructure. However, the living condition in some major cities has improved
considerably in recent years.
they could earn from their old positions at home. They therefore view their postings to China as
attractive opportunities to build up substantial personal savings.
Although managers recruited locally are paid substantially less than their expatriate colleagues, all the
three firms we study in this section claimed that they pay higher-than-market-average salaries to their
local managers.
Home Leaves
In CP, all expatriate managers are entitled to a 30-day paid home leave every year, with roundtrip
airfare paid by the company. Local managers who work outside of their hometowns are also entitled to
similar home leave arrangement with the appropriate transportation costs included.
In the case of Chia Hsin, their expatriate managers earn ten days of paid holidays for every three
months they work. They and their families may use these holidays to travel home or to any holiday
destination of their choice in China, with all expenses reimbursed by the company.
Housing
CP and Chia Hsin provide housing for all their expatriate managers and their families. With some of
their senior expatriate managers stationed in Beijing and Shanghai where real-estate prices are among
the highest in the world, housing subsidies for these managers become a significant part of their
operating overheads.
In the case of CP, since they require most of their local managers to work outside their hometowns,
housing allowance is included in the pay package of many of their local managers, too. However, CP
feed mills are usually located in smaller cities where housing costs are far cheaper than those in
Beijing and Shanghai.
Other Benefits
In addition to the above benefits, most firms also provide financial and administrative assistance to
their expatriate managers to help them relocate before and after their postings to China. Expatriate
managers with children may also receive education allowances for their school-age children.
It is apparent that CP and Chia Hsin still rely heavily on overseas Chinese managers although CP has
obviously spent more effort in localizing their management team. "Posting expatriate managers to
China is very expensive for us since each one of them costs more than ten times to hire than a local
manager does," said Mr. Nirun, "but we often had no choice."
Even though CP and Chia Hsin have been rewarding their expatriate managers handsomely, they
realize how easily other firms in China can poach most of their key executives simply by offering more
attractive material incentives. They therefore always make extra efforts to accommodate individual
needs of their managers. Like many typical Asian conglomerates, they reward loyalty and seniority,
and do so generously.
For example, every Thai knows CP takes exceptionally good care of their veteran employees, and they
do the same, if not better, in China. However, they too have to recognize the value of management
expertise and technical innovations, and reward young professional managers who bring these skills to
the group with good compensation, job security and long-term career path. With a generous reward
structure which is consistent with their long-term investment plan for China, CP has been quite
successful in keeping a team of capable and loyal managers. They in turn have become a key force
behind CP's rapid expansion and diversification in China.
2.3.5 Conclusion
CP, Chia Hsin and Gao Qiu certainly share a lot of similarities in their managerial HR strategies. Being
overseas Chinese firms, they rely almost entirely on overseas Chinese managers to run their operations
in China. All of them feel the need to localize their management, but they are not yet convinced of the
capabilities of the locally hired managers, and only assign less critical managerial tasks to them. They
offer good compensation packages to both their expatriate and local managers, but they feel they have
to do more to encourage loyalty. They provide training to their managers, but put much emphasis on
on-the-job apprenticeship. Being Asian, they can appreciate the importance of personal relationship
and harmony at the workplace, but they are equally troubled by rampant cronyism and nepotism as
their western counterparts.
On the other hand, due to their differences in size, corporate history and industrial background, these
companies also handle their managerial human resources differently in some respects. The paragraphs
that follow highlight and analyze some of these differences.
The CP Group
Among the three overseas Chinese firms studied here, the CP Group appears to have the most
sustainable managerial HR strategy for their operation in China. It is clear that they have learned some
important lessons in HR management after many years of investing and operating in China. They
started with a costly HR strategy that relied heavily on expatriate managers when local management
talent virtually did not exist during the early phase of economic reform in China. As local universities
began to produce business and management graduates as part of the overall economic reform, CP
gradually localized their key management team by hiring more local managers when they became
available. Training was provided to these managers to equip them with both the appropriate skills and
the proper mindset required in managing businesses under a market economy.
Besides systemic factors, CP's HR strategy in China is also determined by the nature of their core
product lines and their strong corporate culture that cherishes long-term business relationship. They
hire both managers who understand local market and local culture, and managers who are capable of
bringing management skills and technical knowledge to local partnerships. Under the leadership of
their regional managers in Beijing, CP forms firm-level functional teams with these managers and let
them complement and monitor each other in their day-to-day operations.
To motivate and retain their managers, CP rewards them generously and expects dedication and loyalty
in return. Given CP's strength in vertical and horizontal integration, their managers are also motivated
by promising long-term career paths that encourage learning through job rotation.
Looking forward, CP's business in China will continue to expand as they ride the wave of economic
reform and leverage their good relationship with the local governments. Since the bulk of their
business is in agro-industry that depends on China's domestic demand, CP growth in China will not be
inhibited significantly by the economic slowdown expected in Asia in the next few years. In fact, CP
will find it easier to localize their management team in China as other export-led foreign firms scale
down their operations and as local institutions produce more professional managers. The expected
restructuring of the SOEs will also create some excess managerial workforce which CP can tap into. If
they continued their localization efforts, CP may one day be able to "export" their managers from
China to their operations in other parts of the world when these managers become business-savvy
enough to take on international challenges.
Chia Hsin Company
Chia Hsin group of companies is the least aggressive among the three firms in localizing their
management. After operating for more than four years in China, overseas Chinese expatriates still
make up of more than 70% of their management team. The author believes the major factor for Chia
Hsin's low level of management localization is the lack of trust for the local Chinese. During the
course of the case interview in Shanghai, the local Chinese managers were described repeatedly to the
author as "untrustworthy", "dishonest" and "greedy." Such suspicious or even contemptuous attitude is
not entirely unfamiliar between Chinese from the mainland and those from Taiwan. Although there is
definitely some degree of truth in what the case interviewee attempted to portray, there are obviously
some historical and political factors behind such mutual mistrust, too.
When Taiwanese firms were exploiting the low labor and operating costs in China for export-oriented
manufacturing, the mutual mistrust between the people from two sides of the Taiwan Straits did not
matter much. The labor-intensive industries concerned required very little management at the level
where these people interact. However, as Taiwanese and other overseas Chinese firms move towards
management-intensive industries in China in response to increasing labor costs, better understanding
and mutual respect need to be cultivated so that local Chinese managers can be entrusted with high
level management tasks to reduce operating costs. Removal of such deep-rooted prejudices may take
many years to realize.
Gao Qiu Golf Resort
Mr. Chen's experience is quite different from those of CP and Chia Hsin. Being a smaller business
away from the major cities, Gao Qiu a very different set of recruitment and management problems.
They were not in the position to attract the best local managerial candidates, and they suffered the
consequences of poor management as a result. They had to use some expatriate and "borrowed"
managers to fill some key vacancies, but they are not convinced that that is a good long-term solution.
In Mr. Chen's opinion, not knowing anything about management is much less harmless than having
the wrong business and management concepts. Those who admit ignorance stand a better chance in
learning the right ways of doing things, whereas those who put wrong knowledge into practice create
problems in businesses that are difficult to undo once damages are done. "The golf course project
could have been completed in 18 months if everything was done right from the very beginning. Poor
management caused the project to drag on for three years, including six months of remedial works to
set things straight."
Chapter Three - Supply-Side Case Study
As discussed in Chapter One, the supply side of the managerial human-resource market in China can
be divided into the following sources and subcategories:
Sources Subcategories
Expatriate managers - Overseas Chinese
- Non-Chinese Foreigners
Chinese nationals from abroad
Local managers 0 Existing managerial pool
- New management graduates
It is clear that the expatriate managers, especially the overseas Chinese managers, have been playing a
major role in managing foreign-owned and joint-venture enterprises in China since the beginning of
the economic reform. However, as seen in the cases in the previous chapter, much localization effort is
currently underway to produce a larger management workforce in China to make business more
sustainable in the long run and to support the fast growing management-intensive industries. If cost
and quality are the main considerations in building up the management workforce of a nation, the "new
management graduates" category is no doubt the most important and most promising among all the
sources in the long run.
To better understand the current status of management education in China, this chapter studies an
American-China initiative in management education. Besides examining the design and
implementation of the program in detail, this chapter also compares it against a typical American MBA
program to highlight differences and similarities.
3.1 The MIT-China Management Education Project
3.1.1 Program Background
The MIT Sloan School of Management and two top universities in China, Tsinghua University in
Beijing and Fudan University in Shanghai, are currently engaged in a five-year collaboration to train
managers in China. The author took a close look at this education joint venture by interviewing the
faculty, students and administrators from these universities who are involved in the project. The author
also attended some classes in Beijing and Shanghai with the first batch of MBA students this program
recruited.
MIT Sloan School of Management
The Sloan School of management in Cambridge, Massachusetts has one of the most reputable MBA
programs in the world23 . Its two-year MBA program admits approximately 350 students each year.
One of the major strength of the Sloan MBA program is the diversity of its student body. Thirty seven
percent of Sloan's master's program students in 1998 are international students from 57 different
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countries
Sloan's interest in global development started many years ago. In the 1960s, for example, Sloan led the
development of the Indian Institute of Management in Calcutta. The school also had a five-year
collaboration project with the Nanyang Business School in Singapore. Besides, Sloan had conducted
other joint programs in Taiwan, Mexico and Chile.
Academically, Sloan is renowned for its strength in finance, operation research, international
management, marketing and technological innovations. It has nearly 100 full-time faculty members
representing a wide range of research and teaching interests in current management issues and
disciplines. Besides the MBA program, Sloan also runs an undergraduate program, a doctorate
23 The US. News & World Report ranked Sloan's MBA program first, second, fourth and third in 1995, 1996,
1997 and 1998 respectively. Business Week ranked Sloan's MBA program ninth in 1996.
24 Source: Brochure for Sloan Master's Program 1997-1998 and 1998-1999
program and two one-year executives programs - the Management of Technology program and the
Sloan Fellow program.
Tsinghua University, Beijing
Tsinghua University2 is located in a scenic campus in the capital city of China. It is best known for its
engineering schools and it sometimes pride itself as "MIT of China." Tsinghua was founded in 1911
as a preparatory school for U.S. universities and became a university in 1925. Its graduate school, the
first in the country, was founded in 1984. Tsinghua's School of Economics and Management was
formed in the same year. Mr. Zhu Rongji, the newly elected premier of China, has been the Dean of
the school since then. Since its founding, Tsinghua's School of Economics and Management had
graduated 600 undergraduates and 1000 master's and doctorate students. Today, the school has more
than 100 faculty members, 550 undergraduate students and 850 graduate degree candidates.
In 1991, Tsinghua became one of the first nine universities hand-picked by the State Education
Committee to offer MBA programs in China. It was given the mission of training management talent
to help develop a "socialism with Chinese characteristics." It set itself a target to become a leading
management school in the world by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the university. The
program has been expanding rapidly over the years and has become the largest MBA program in
China. In September 1998, 284 new students were admitted to Tsinghua's MBA program.
Fudan University, Shanghai
Shanghai is the most metropolitan city in China due to its extensive trade contacts with the western
world since the cannons of the Opium Wars blew open the doors of feudal China in the mid 19th
century. As a result, Shanghai residents are known to be the best business people in China. It is
therefore small wonder that Fudan University, known to be the best university in southern China, also
runs one of the best and most popular management schools in the country.
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Fudan University2 6, originally called Fudan Public School, was founded in 1905, and became a private
university in 1917. Fudan was the first university in China to have a department of business
administration in 1920. That later became School of Business in 1929. Under the reform and open-
door policy, Fudan was again the first in the country to resume its management education. Its
department of Management Science was established in 1979. That evolved into the School of
Management in 1985. Currently, Fudan School of Management runs 4 doctorate degree programs, 10
master's degree program and 8 undergraduate programs.
The IMBA Initiative
After running their MBA programs for years, some Chinese universities found that the best way to
accelerate the upgrade of their business schools to international standard is to borrow course contents
and teaching models from established overseas institutions. On the other hand, foreign companies
targeting China's attractive consumer market regard top-notch universities like Tsinghua and Fudan as
their primary sources of local management talent. These two factors have created a very favorable
environment in China for international collaboration in management training. Many foreign
institutions have proposed various exchange and collaborative programs to jointly develop China's
future business leaders. Unfortunately, not unlike the situation for a lot of foreign-Sino joint ventures,
many memoranda of understanding were signed but few collaboration initiatives had created
significant long-term impact due to the lack of sustainable funding and other administrative
difficulties. Only the most carefully planned and properly funded programs stand a chance to deliver
meaningful result in the long run. The international MBA (IMBA) program MIT's Sloan School of
Management established with Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management and
Fudan University's School of Management is one of the rare success stories of such efforts.
The MIT-China Management Education Project began in 1996 as part of Sloan's on-going global
engagement in management education. Thanks to its many years of experience in the international
arena and the lessons learned from similar projects by others in China, Sloan has designed a
collaborative program that is most likely to have a significant impact in the long run. The following
sections take a closer look at the design of this program and its implementation.
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3.1.2 Objectives and Design
Program Objectives
The IMBA program was designed and implemented by the parties involved with the following
objectives in mind:
- To train professional managers for China's increasingly global economy;
- To allow Sloan as a management research institute to learn more about doing business in China in
the process;
a To create and maintain a strong tie between Sloan and the business and academic communities in
China, which will facilitate further cooperation in the future;
- From a broader perspective, the three universities involved in the project hope their collaborative
efforts will eventually produce a proven management education model for widespread
implemented in China;
= Lastly, the program can also be viewed as an effort on Sloan's part to tap into the prosperous Asian
region for operating and research funds.
Program Design
The IMBA program is run as a separate program from the regular MBA program currently being
offered by Fudan and Tsinghua. Although the names of the courses taught in both the programs may
appear very similar, the contents of these programs are significantly different. While the regular MBA
programs focus heavily on business and management issues of the local Chinese environment, the
content of the IMBA program is much more global and, to some extent, Americanized due to its Sloan
origin. In fact, most of the course materials used in the IMBA program are derived from what MBA
students used at Sloan.
Another major difference is language. While the regular MBA classes are taught entirely in Chinese
based on Chinese-language material, the IMBA program requires the use of English as the major, if
not the only, medium of instruction throughout the program. Original English editions of textbooks,
case study materials and other readings are used. Instructors are expected to conduct classes in English
and students use English in all their homework assignments and class discussions.
The way in which IMBA courses are taught and learned is also very different from how regular MBA
classes are run. Regular MBA classes are taught in the typical lecture style found in most Asian
classrooms where knowledge is spoon-fed to students by supposedly know-it-all teachers. Students are
not encouraged to express their own opinions and the authority of the instructor is not to be challenged.
On the other hand, professors teaching IMBA classes are expected to teach in the American case
discussion format. They are expected to encourage open discussion in class so that students learn to
tolerate ambiguities and accept opposing views. Teamwork is to be encouraged among students, too.
Significant proportions of the grades students received from their courses are based on class
participation and teamwork efforts.
Training China's Future Managers
The training aspect of Sloan's IMBA program serves two purposes: besides training managers for
foreign multinationals operating in China, it also trains future managers for local Chinese companies
so that their management team can be adequately staffed to become competitive in the global market.
"We really start the program not focus on China, but focus on standard MBA knowledge taught in any
leading business school in the world," said Professor Donald Lessard of Sloan. "But later in the
program, there is a great deal of emphasis on what we call the dual integration of China - the
problems or issues facing firms from outside of China when they do business in China, and the
problems of Chinese firms when they seek to become international players themselves."
Since the Sloan IMBA program takes both local and international factors into consideration, managers
trained under the program will be able to compete and communicate comfortably with MBAs
graduates trained elsewhere in the world. In other words, they will become ideal managers for Chinese
enterprises inspired to take on the world, as well as foreign firms who wish to localize their
management in China.
Mutual Learning
The MIT-China project is both an educational and a research collaboration. Besides helping the
Chinese universities to develop management talent for China's job market, Sloan also hopes to benefit
by learning more about doing business in China while sharing its management education knowledge
and experiences with its Chinese counterparts. "Through this educational and research collaboration,
we are establishing the common ground of understanding that will lead to the successful integration of
China into the world economy for the benefit of all," said Glen Urban, Dean of the Sloan School of
Management.
In fact, this is not the first time Sloan attempted to learn more about a foreign country through
educational collaboration. A good case in point is an exchange program Sloan had with Japan in the
1980's. As a result of that program, Sloan had developed considerable amount of expertise in Japanese
economy and operation practices. "To us, this kind of international collaborations are well worth our
efforts and investment since they allow us to study a country's problem up close and gain first-hand
knowledge on them. That, over time, will create some experts in this institution for a given country or
region," said Lester Thurow, a senior professor and a formal Dean of Sloan who chairs the MIT-China
project.
Building an International Network
Another long-term objective of the MIT-China initiative is to create a strong international network
among the organizations and individuals involved in the program. Not only will the faculty members
and administrators work on the program together and become close colleagues, students in these three
institutions are expected to learn from each other through various exchange activities, too. Given the
very diverse community in Sloan, this will, over time, form a truly international network for future
academic collaborations and business partnerships.
Training the Trainers
Besides sufficient funding and strong commitment from all parties, Sloan believes the IMBA program
must be sustainable in the first place in order to maximize its impact in the long run. A unique
"training the trainers" approach was introduced to ensure increasing returns from the project's
investment.
Other collaborative programs for management education in China either send foreign faculty to teach
in China or send Chinese students to study abroad. The China European International Business School
(CEIBS), a Jiaotong University and European Union collaboration in Shanghai, for example, sends
foreign instructors to China to teach management courses based on short-term contracts. "We call that
the missionary approach, and there is no doubt that it can be very effective in the short run," said Alan
White, a Senior Associate Dean at Sloan who directs the Sloan-China initiative. "However, we think
that approach is costly and may not be sustainable in the long run when funding runs out."
In order to make sure the Chinese universities have enough teaching resources to continuously expand
their capacity in the future, Sloan decided to experiment with an innovative approach that
systematically train Chinese faculty on MIT campus in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Chinese faculty
members are invited to live and work on Sloan campus so that they can dedicate months of undivided
attention in learning how a top American MBA program functions. Since many of them are first-time
visitors to the United States, they are also given the opportunity to experience the daily life of a market
and capitalist economy by living amidst an American society. Such distinct personal experience will
no doubt help them become better teachers for international MBA courses when they return to China.
Sloan believes Chinese business school faculty who learn how to teach modern business courses
through this process will be able to in turn train better teachers for their institutions in the future.
Tapping into Asia's Wealth
During a "town meeting" with Sloan students recently, Professor Glen Urban, the Dean of Sloan since
1993, quoted the MIT-China project and a few other international collaborations in Asia as important
revenue sources for Sloan to develop into a better business school. In fact, MIT and Sloan alumni in
Asia have been very supportive of the school's effort to build a stronger tie with Asia. Tang Center,
Sloan's new business school building that hosts most of its classes and students activities, was build
primarily with the generous donation of an Asian alumnus. A program like the MIT-China project is
no doubt another good channel for Asian alumni to contribute financially to the school's globalization
effort.
3.1.3 Program Implementation
This section examines how the Sloan-China collaboration was implemented, and to what extent the
program's objectives discussed above have been achieved so far.
Fundraising
Tsinghua and Fudan were not expected to provide any direct funding for the program. Therefore, Sloan
alone was responsible to raise all the funds required to meet the financial needs of the program.
Besides covering administrative costs of the program, the IMBA project also needs funds for faculty
and curriculum development, and to finance all the exchange activities involved. In addition, the
program pays for all the course materials used by the faculty and the students in the program. The
fundraising target for the IMBA program was set at US$10 million for the initial five-year phase of the
project.
Since it is unlikely that the Chinese government would provide any funding to the IMBA program, and
since Sloan wanted the program to be financially independent so that it can be run with a free hand, the
program had decided to raise all the required funds from the business community. The potential donors
were firms with strong business interests in China because they were most likely to benefit directly or
indirectly from the program through their needs in managerial human resources. The fund raising
campaign also targeted Sloan alumni in Asia specifically because the fundraisers believed Sloan
Alumni's prior international experiences at Sloan would make them more likely to contribute to the
globalization efforts of their alma mater.
It turned out that almost all funding for the program was donated by Asian companies, most of them
from Hong Kong and Taiwan, and MIT/Sloan alumni from Asia who thought the program was a good
idea. Although the program did try to raise funds from American multinationals with heavy
investments in China - for example, General Motor and Motorola - these companies often decline the
invitation to participate since their human resource policies required them to train their managers in-
house. "When we talked to them, they invited us to conduct in-house programs exclusively for their
employees. They failed to see how they could benefit by contributing to a general and public program
like this," said Alan White of Sloan. "However, training managers for some specific firms is not our
objective, and we simply don't have enough resources to do that after committing to Tsinghua and
Fudan."
According to White, most western firms in China are not willing to fund the IMBA program and the
like because they understood, rightly or wrongly, that most MBA candidates in China are company-
sponsored students instead of "free agents" whom they can target to recruit. However, overseas
Chinese and other Asian companies are less pragmatic and more far-sighted. They believe they will be
able to hire from the pool of management talent trained by these programs in the long run, after the
students have fulfilled the obligations of their sponsorship. Besides, many Asian sponsors who are
accustomed to political patronage also expect to gain brand-name exposure through their financial
contributions to management education. They hope the students graduate from these programs will one
day become business leaders of China who will remember and reward those who sponsored their
management education.
Student Selection
Tsinghua and Fudan each has its own regular MBA program since 1991. Students who are interested in
the IMBA programs must fulfill all the admission criteria and sit for the same entrance examination as
the rest of the MBA program candidates (please refer to Section 1.3 above). However, those who
express interest in pursuing the IMBA program have to make it through an additional set of tests and
interviews after their acceptance to the regular MBA program. Since the IMBA courses are taught
primarily in English using mostly English material, having a good command of English is the most
basic admission criterion. The test of English for IMBA admissions includes testing a candidate's
ability to listen, speak, read and write in English. A candidate's performance in the entrance
examination and their work experience are other important criteria for their IMBA acceptance. Due to
resource constraints, only about 40 students in each of the two schools are admitted to IMBA for the
1997 and 1998 academic years. Those who sit for the IMBA tests but fail to qualify may still enroll in
the regular MBA program.
In the case of Tsinghua, for example, around 800 candidates applied for the regular MBA program for
the entering class in 1997. About 280 students were admitted, and only 90 of them did well enough in
their English examination to qualify for further tests and interviews for the IMBA program. Forty
candidates were finally accepted to the pilot IMBA class. All the rest who did not make it remain in
the regular MBA program.
Faculty Training
As discussed above, faculty training is the core of the IMBA program. Much emphasis has therefore
been put on this element of the program to make sure the visiting professors from Tsinghua and Fudan
get the most out of their visits to Sloan.
During the first phase of the IMBA project, six Chinese faculty members, three each from Tsinghua
and Fudan, visit Sloan each semester for four semesters. In other words, a total of twenty-four Chinese
professors would be trained in a period of two years. During his/her stay at Sloan, each of the Chinese
professors is assigned a faculty host who is usually a full-time Sloan professor who shares the visiting
professor's research interest. Throughout their stay at Sloan, the visiting professors work closely with
their Sloan faculty hosts in various aspects of the development of one or more IMBA courses. They
attend classes, engage in faculty meetings, and prepare course material for the new courses they intend
to teach upon their return to China. Some of the Chinese professors also take part in orientation
activities for incoming students, join student discussions and participate in other student teamwork
activities to observe first-hand how American MBA students learn, work and interact in teams. During
their stay, the visiting professors learn to take advantage of the computer infrastructure in the most
"wired" campus in the country to communicate with those at home. They share the progress of their
studies with their colleagues and students regularly through e-mail, and will be able to do the same
through videoconferencing in the near future.
"Initially, we were afraid that, for one reason or another, Tsinghua and Fudan might not be able to send
their best faculty members to Sloan," confessed Thurow. "Later, we were really pleased when we
found that all the professors who visited us were young, talented and enthusiastic about management
education."
Another major concern for the teaching of IMBA courses is the readiness of Chinese professors to
change from the traditional lecture-style teaching to the MBA case-discussion style that emphasizes
student participation. The author had an opportunity to discuss this issue with a visiting professor from
Tsinghua University during the fall semester of 1996. He told the author he had always been teaching
business strategy by giving a series of 45-minute lectures without any input from the students, and he
did not think the students were ready to change even if he was prepared to introduce open case
discussions in his classes. He therefore felt strongly that he should continue to lecture in his classes
upon his return to China. In April 1998, the author visited Tsinghua University for an on-site study for
this thesis. Sitting in the Strategic Management class taught by the same professor, the author was
quite surprised to find that a case discussion on business strategy for Intel was conducted in very much
the same way as it would have been conducted in an American MBA classroom. The author was also
impressed by both the enthusiasm in the class discussion and the quality of its content. The fact that the
Chinese professor's eventually decided to teach in the "American way" demonstrated his recognition
of case discussion as a better way to train China's future managers. On the other hand, the students'
readiness to adopt the new format of learning showed their determination and capability to adapt in an
increasingly global business environment.
"I think the problem doesn't lie with the students," said Professor Shi Yongheng, currently visiting
Sloan from Tsinghua University, when asked how he will encourage his students to actively participate
in class discussions. "The professor must induce the students to express their opinions in class, and the
best way to do that is through the grading system". According to Shi, a student's performance in a
regular MBA course depends almost entirely on the final examination. He plans to follow the Sloan
grading system instead when he returns to Tsinghua to teach International Management in the fall
semester of 1998. "I will do away with the final exam all together. I will have 30% of the grade for
class participation, and the rest of the grade for presentation and written case reports," said Professor
Shi.
Curriculum Design
To Tsinghua and Fudan, the collaboration with Sloan offers a unique opportunity to experiment with a
new management curriculum that promises to prepare future managers for China's increasingly global
economy. The IMBA programs at Tsinghua and Fudan have constructed their initial curricula based
largely on a series of relevant courses in Sloan's MBA program. For example, most IMBA courses use
the same Harvard Business School case studies used heavily in Sloan classes. However, a considerable
amount of effort is also spent on making sure that the IMBA curricula have the appropriate amount of
"Chinese content" to suit the background and expectation of the Chinese students. This is done by
either including Chinese business cases in the syllabus or by modifying western cases to incorporate
some Chinese perspectives and experiences.
According to Professor Shi who is finalizing the syllabus for the International Management course he
will teach at Tsinghua, good business cases based on Chinese firms or Chinese experiences are hard to
come by. This is partially due to the short history of case-study teaching methodology in China. "I
heard a professional case writer from Harvard Business School can finish writing a case in less than a
week, but it took me nine months to write my last case when I did it on a part-time basis," said Shi.
Furthermore, writing and publishing business cases are expensive endeavors and funding for such
activities is extremely limited in China.
Although there is a short supply of published business cases on Chinese firms, some professors in the
IMBA programs seem to be able to overcome this problem by taking advantage of the reputation and
location of their institutions. Fudan and Tsinghua, located in Shanghai and Beijing respectively, are
surrounded by a large number of foreign and local businesses that have established their country head
offices in these cities. Given the fame of these institutions as leading universities having the top
business schools in the country, managers and business leaders are eager to visit the schools and share
their business experiences with the students and the faculty. Local firms are eager to learn some
cutting-edge business and management skills from the schools, whereas foreign firms are looking to
add some Chinese perspectives to their business strategies. The schools can then take advantage of
such relationship with the business communities to offer some real-life exposure to their students. For
example, while the franchise strategy of Kentucky Fried Chicken was discussed in a Management
Strategy course in Tsinghua, the story of a pioneer Chinese franchisee, now the Vice President of KFC
in South East Asia, was added to the content of the original case. Besides, the said franchisee himself
was invited to class to share his experience with the IMBA students.
"We have no problem finding business people to speak in our classes at all," said Professor Shi. "In
fact, our problem is an opposite one - we often find ourselves having to politely and tactfully turn
away business people who offer to come to talk to us."
While writing a thesis is optional in the Sloan MBA program, the Chinese universities require every
MBA students to write a thesis during the final year of the program. This can be a good source of
Chinese business cases if some of the relevant theses can be further developed into teaching materials.
Building a Sloan-China Network
Since the launch of the Sloan-China project in 1996, not only have the professors and administrators of
the project become close colleagues, students from the three universities had begun to work with each
other through various formal and informal exchanges, too. Some examples of the international
interactions resulted from the Sloan-China project are listed below:
- The Sloan China Trip visited Tsinghua University and had a group dialogue with its MBA students
in March 1997. Close to a hundred MBA students from both schools exchanged ideas on
academic, economic and social issues for hours in a Chinese classroom after having dinner
together in the school canteen. That unique opportunity of cross-cultural learning has become a
new tradition of the Sloan study trip held during spring break every year. Another group of MBA
students from Sloan, many visiting Asia for the first time, visited a new batch of Tsinghua students
in March 1998 in a similar setting. Due to the very positive feedback from the students of both
schools, the author believes such exchange forum will continue to be held every year.
- A Chinese professor visiting Sloan to design teaching material for an international management
course for the IMBA program invited students from Sloan to participate in Internet discussions
with her Chinese students. Sloan students from different parts of the world responded to her
request and agreed to share opinions through world-wide-web discussions in the future.
- After learning career development services are not yet available to the IMBA students, more than
thirty MBA students from Sloan showed their support by volunteering to edit resumes for
Tsinghua students to help them improve their chances of securing summer internship with foreign
enterprises in China.
- The author interviewed several professors from Fudan and Tsinghua in the process of writing this
thesis. He also visited the campuses of these Chinese universities to attend lectures and to talk to
Chinese students in both the regular MBA and IMBA programs. Some supportive and resourceful
IMBA students from Tsinghua continued to help the author later by providing data and answering
questions promptly through e-mail. The author deeply appreciates their helpfulness and
willingness to share ideas and information.
A group of ten Sloan students from the student organization Project Team visited Beijing for five
days in March 1998 to teach team building skills to Tsinghua MBA students. "We learned some
very valuable lessons from the Project Team's visit," said Patrick Lee, a first-year Tsinghua IMBA
student. "We have always been taught how to be a good leader, but this is the first time we learn
how to play the support and coordination roles when others lead. By observing how the Sloan
students work seamlessly together as a teaching team, we also realize how a group of very
different individuals can develop extremely good teamwork understanding among them."
To the Sloan students in Project Team, all of them visiting China for the first time, it was a once-
in-a-lifetime cultural and academic experience. While they were not teaching, they were taken
around to sample authentic Chinese food in Beijing and visit historical places during the weekend,
and some good friendship developed during their short encounter with the Chinese students. "I'm
beginning to miss my students already," said Ellen Sandler, a second-year Sloan students, two day
after leaving Beijing.
As current and future generations of students, faculty and alumni from Sloan, Fudan and Tsinghua
continue to learn from and about each other, the cross-cultural relationship they build up through the
IMBA program will extend into their future career and benefit them in many ways. A strong and
extended international network like this will no doubt have a very positive impact on the further
globalization of the business world.
Monitoring Progress
Even though clear objectives and targets have been set for the implementation of the IMBA program,
there is no guarantee that Tsinghua and Fudan are able to adhere fully to the implementation plan
agreed upon. According to White, recruiting students for the program and having the proper course
materials in place were not too big a worry. The major concern was the teaching component of the
program. "It is more of a language, or even cultural barrier. For example, some of the professors
openly acknowledged that their students have better command of English than the professors
27 The Sloan Project Team is a seven-year-old student organization run by Sloan MBA students committed to
learning, creating and sharing teamwork skills, and to building a world-class team environment at Sloan. Over
the years, Project Team has developed a variety of team skill teaching materials and seminars for Masters
Program students. As team-based management is becoming increasingly important to employers worldwide,
Project Team's efforts assist Sloan students in leading this change.
themselves do. It is therefore more convenient for them to teach in the traditional lecture style and
spoon-feed the students than to conduct interactive case discussions. Or they may even decide to teach
in Chinese instead of English as agreed upon," said White. "Although we provide all the funding, we
basically have no control over how and what they teach. We can only influence."
However, Sloan does monitor the progress of the project closely by having formal review conference
with their Chinese counterparts every summer, either in China or in Cambridge. "They are top schools
in a big and proud country, and they view us as their equal. In other words, we are in no position to tell
them what to do. However, we do try our best to point out to them the areas in which we think they are
lagging," said Professor Donald Lessard of Sloan, who is on the advisory board of the MIT-China
Project. For example, Sloan is urging Tsinghua and Fudan to set up career development offices (CDO)
to help the IMBA students in their search for summer internship and permanent employment after
graduation. The CDO at Sloan plays a central role in job placement for Sloan's MBA students, and
Sloan wishes to see similar facilities being set up in Tsinghua and Fudan to effectively market the new
IMBA program to potential recruiters in China.
3.1.4 The IMBA Students
Competitive Environment Admits Only the Best
Fudan and Tsinghua are both leading universities in China. Given the large population of China and
the heavy emphasis its people traditionally place on education, the race to secure a place in these
universities is extremely competitive. The IMBA program had an admission rate of less than 5% in
199728, and it is expected to become even more competitive in the years to come 29 . Given such
competitiveness, those admitted are undoubtedly among the very best in their peer group. The author
has had the opportunities to interact with some IMBA students in a number of occasions and found that
this is indeed the case.
After spending a day with some IMBA students in Tsinghua, the author finds the IMBA students
mature, intelligent and vigorous. Despite their limited exposure to the "outside world", they have an
exceptionally good understanding of the micro and macro environments around them, and one can
easily tell they are capable of making the best out of what they have. They are also very curious about
the part of the world they are less familiar with, and they always try to learn more about it by asking
their visitors from abroad. Like young students in most cultures, they see the needs for changes in their
society, but they view that as their future challenges. Talking to the IMBA students, the author could
sense their optimism about their own future and the future of their society, which is probably the result
of the general improvement of life in China in the past ten years. Like most American MBA students,
they work hard, they have fun, and they are proud of themselves.
The IMBA students are observed to be quite comfortable with computer and communication
technology. The Tsinghua students, for example, each has his/her own e-mail account which they use
freely, frequently and "bilingually" to communicate with each other and with the "outside world." In
the few occasions the author requested for information for this thesis through e-mail, Tsinghua
students responded promptly, sometimes within hours despite the 12-hour time difference. After the
author complained about not being able to relate names on their business cards and the faces of the
21 In 1997, 965 and 810 candidates applied for the MBA programs of Fudan and Tsinghua respectively. About 40
students were qualified for the IMBA class of each of these schools. (Source: http://www.cm.tsinghua.edu.cn/
docs c/Committee 1/nmbac4.htm)
IMBA students he has met, he received a digitized photo book of the entire Tsinghua IMBA class
through e-mail two hours later!
Financial and Academic Hardship
Many IMBA students are under heavy financial burden since the cost of attending business school in
China is high without company sponsorship (the same can of course be said for American business
schools). In Tsinghua University, for example, the total two-year tuition for the entering class in 1997
is 27,000 RMB (US$3,260) 30, which is more than twice the average annual income of a Chinese
worker. The tuition will be raised to 40,000 RMB (US$4,830) for the class entering the program later
this year, which is an increase of 48%. Besides, subsidized campus housing is only available to the top
30 non-local MBA students - IMBA or otherwise - based on their entrance examination results. One of
the students the author met has to cycle for one hour each way between campus and his rented home
everyday.
Despite the financial hardship, the IMBA students apparently enjoy the challenges they face. Like
most Sloan students, they complain about the heavy workload of the intensive program, but they know
they have to work hard to learn their skills. "The first semester was really a struggle for all of us due to
the amount of homework and class preparation we had to complete everyday. No one gave up and, in
the end, all of us survived and learned a great deal," recalled George Jiao from Tsinghua, who
obviously has no regret for all the long nights he had to put in. Similar statements can be heard from
most Sloan MBA students. Both programs obviously employ the same strategy of pushing the students
to new limits so that they realize their own intellectual strengths.
Being International and Business-Like
Another similarity between Sloan MBA students and the IMBA students is the use of business cards
on campus. Every IMBA student in Tsinghua carries professionally printed business cards with
standard design. The cards are bilingual with Chinese on one side and English on the other. Besides
their names and title ("International MBA Candidate"), also printed on their cards are the institution
(e.g. "Tsinghua University School of Economics & Management") and program (e.g. "MIT-Tsinghua
29 In comparison, Sloan MBA admission rate for the graduation class of 2000 is slightly less that 12%.
30 Based on US$1 = 8.28 RMB
International MBA Program") they are affiliated with, their individual e-mail addresses from the
school, and their personal pager or telephone numbers.
Interestingly, almost every one of the IMBA students uses an "English name" that precedes his/her
family name instead of having their first and middle name romanized for the English side of their
cards. Names printed on the business cards the author received include Patrick, Richard, Victor,
Warren, Harold and George. The use of such names on their business cards (despite the strong
Chinese tradition against changing one's name) is obviously aimed at facilitating their interactions
with foreigners, since westerners usually find Chinese names difficult to pronounce and remember.
"Westerners do the same when they come to do business in China," said Patrick Lee. "They give
themselves Chinese names so that we can remember them."
While the use of business cards reflects the business-like setting of the IMBA environment, the content
of the cards highlights the international aspect of the program.
Lack of Diversity
Like their counterparts at Sloan, most IMBA students have three to five years of work experience,
have undergraduate degree in engineering or other disciplines, and are between 25 and 30 years of age.
However, a major difference between the IMBA schools and Sloan is the level of diversity of the
student body. While around 40% of the current Sloan MBA classes consists of international students
from more than 50 different countries 31, the MBA and IMBA classes of Fudan and Tsinghua are made
up almost entirely of Chinese students from different parts of China.
"A visiting Sloan student asked me why there are no international students in our international MBA
program. I had to tell her the word "international" describes the content of our program, not its
students," quipped a Tsinghua student. This in fact is a serious shortcoming of the IMBA program,
since much of the learning of a truly global MBA program takes place through interactions among
students from very diverse backgrounds. Although the IMBA program is considering admitting some
overseas Chinese students from South East Asia, it will be a long while before it can become reputable
3 Thirty-seven percent of Sloan's MBA class of 1998 is international students. The 1997-98 MBA student body
of Sloan is made up of students from 57 different countries.
enough to attract good students from all parts of the world. Until then, it will not be able to enjoy the
level of diversity found at Sloan and other top American business schools.
Lack of International and Market Exposure
Since China had closed its door to the international community for a long period of time before the
recent economic reform, very few of her citizens have had the opportunity to travel or work abroad.
Therefore, unlike the more fortunate and well-traveled Sloan students, most IMBA students have never
set foot outside their own country. Furthermore, most of them worked under the command system of a
planned economy before they returned to school for their MBA degree. Therefore, most of the market
economy concepts found in the IMBA courses are new and foreign to them. Unlike their relatively
business-savvy counterparts at Sloan who live in the most capitalist society in the world, they have no
past experiences to draw upon and very few real-life cases around them from which they can observe
and learn.
"The main problem with Chinese management students is their attitude and mindset," said Thurow.
"They work hard, they are smart, and they can memorize and analyze well - no doubt about that.
However, they have been trained to manage by volume and capacity under the planned economy, and
it is impossible to change that mindset overnight. Most of them do not have enough exposure to the
market economy to allow them to think and react in the right business sense, and that will only change
over time."
Sitting in his temporary office at Sloan, Professor Yin Xiangshuo from Fudan University brought up
another problem with his Chinese students. "Chinese students are not good at dealing with ambiguities.
The old [socialist] system has taught them to expect the correct answer to every question and the right
solution to every problem. This kind of mentality makes case discussions in MBA classes difficult,
since there is usually no "right" solution to a given business case. Students are not supposed to
memorize solutions to solve management problems in western MBA education, but Chinese students
often expect their teachers to provide standard answers to their questions," said Professor Yin.
3.1.5 Career Prospect
Job Options
Like American MBA students, most students in China enroll in an MBA program to learn the
necessary management and business skills to improve their career prospect and broaden their career
options after graduation. However, the career targets for the IMBA students are somewhat more
specific. With the exception of those sponsored by state-owned enterprises, almost all the rest of the
students hope to be employed by a foreign firm or a foreign joint venture company upon graduation.
They believe they can then leverage their unique IMBA credential in a supposedly more challenging,
and therefore more interesting and more rewarding international career.
In Tsinghua University, for example, about a third of the current batch of thirty-nine32 IMBA students
are sponsored by state-owned enterprises. All the rest are "independent" students who pay their own
tuition and other expenses of attending the program. Although some who worked for SOEs before
going to Tsinghua had the option of accepting sponsorship and return to their original employers after
the program, most chose not to do so if they can afford to support themselves financially. "In the
current system, only seniority counts. All I can get if I return to my old employer with an MBA degree
is probably an extra 10 RMB per month. I won't even get a promotion because I simply have to wait
for my turn," said a Tsinghua IMBA student. "I am much better off looking for a job outside." Even
for those with sponsorship, some are considering breaching the contracts with their current employers
and pay the fines if they find doing that is better for their long-term career. Should they decide to
return to fulfill their sponsorship obligations, most of them will have to work for four to seven years
with their respective SOEs. To some of them, that will be too much time wasted on unproductive
career and missing much better opportunities elsewhere.
Another factor worth noting is the new development in the SOEs since Zhu Rongji, the new premier of
China, announced the decision to restructure state-owned enterprises and their human resource policies
in March 1998. The author was told that some IMBA students sponsored by two large SOEs are
expecting to see some policy changes which may affect their sponsorship. However, no one is certain
about the specific impacts of such changes at this stage until more details are announced.
32 One of the students from the original class of forty decided to leave after the first semester to pursue a legal
career instead.
Summer Internship
As in the case of American MBA programs, the best way for an IMBA student to evaluate a career
option is to work in an internship for a potential permanent employer during the summer between the
first and second year of the program. This is especially helpful in the IMBA situation because working
for a foreign and private organization is and entirely new experience to many of the students.
However, since these students were the first batch of IMBA candidates made available to the job
market, awareness of the program as a source of managerial employees is rather low among recruiters
in China. The fact that Fudan and Tsinghua have not yet established career development services for
their IMBA students has also caused much concern. Sloan had decided to help by recommending the
IMBA students to its worldwide network of industrial and alumni contacts.
Sloan's marketing effort has yielded some reasonably good results to date. By the end of April 1998,
about 20 foreign and joint-venture companies have expressed interest in hiring from the first batch of
IMBA students at Tsinghua University for summer positions. Among these companies are major MNC
investors in China, including Andersen Consulting, Ericsson, General Electric, Hewlett-Packard,
Johnson & Johnson, Motorola, Nokia, Siemens and United Parcel Services. Among those who offer
summer internship opportunities to the IMBA students also include a Taiwanese company, a Chinese
investment bank and a Hong Kong firms which is also a major sponsor of the IMBA program. Besides
positions in Beijing and Shanghai, some of the students have been offered to work in places like
Guangdong Province, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Mauritius and even the United States.
While MBA students at Sloan are not required to work in the summer, most do because good jobs are
abundant, and an average monthly salary of US$7,000-8,000 is too good to forgo. However, all IMBA
students are required to work in the summer even though there is much less financial incentive for
them to do so, at least for now (see "Compensation" section below). To motivate them to gain some
additional work experience in between their MBA years, every IMBA student is required to turn in a
summer job report, whereas working in the summer is optional for the regular MBA program.
Meeting the Employers' Demand
Although the list of recruiters was impressive, not all IMBA students are popular among the potential
employers. According to Patrick Lee, the class monitor of Tsinghua's IMBA class of 1999, most
employees look for students with vast work experience and good engineering background. Lee, for
example, has a mechanical engineering degree from Tsinghua University, specializing in automobile
manufacturing. He worked for three different automobile manufacturers in three different provinces
before he returned to Tsinghua for his MBA degree. He has also travel widely on his own initiative to
visit every major automobile manufacturing plants in China in order to study and compare their
operations. Lee has secured three offers for summer internship by end of April and he is expecting to
get more before he makes up his mind. Fourteen other classmates of Lee have also been offered to
work of foreign firms or JV in the summer.
On the other hand, Lee's classmates with less impressive background are not as popular among the
recruiters. About 15 of the 39 IMBA students at Tsinghua have not even had a single job interview by
the end of April. Most of them have less job experience and have undergraduate degrees in arts or
humanities. However, they believe there are still plenty of opportunities and do expect to land
themselves a job somewhere before summer begins. In the worst case, most of them can quite easily
return to their previous work units or go to other SOEs to work in the summer.
Compensation
The IMBA students are not as fortunate as Sloan MBA students who can command an average of
US$7,000-9,000 a month in the summer. They are typically paid a salary of 3,000 RMB (US$380) a
month, and some get no salary at all but will only be given allowances for their living expenses. Most
students are still eager to work for the employers listed above even though some of them can make as
much as 10,000 RMB per month working for an SOE. "We are still willing to accept the job because
we think the working experience at a famous international company will add value to us, and it will
help us find a better job when we graduate next year," said an IMBA student. As good MBA students,
they are able to analyze their situation from the employers' perspective and consider what they have
been offered as fair. They realize both the idea of paid internship and the IMBA program itself are new
in China. The firms that plan to hire them know very little about their capabilities and are therefore
taking risks with them. On the other hand, they do expect a somewhat higher salary range of 5,000 -
10,000 RMB per month after they have graduated with their MBA degrees.
3.1.6 Other Challenges
Meeting the Language Requirement
The original plan of the IMBA program is to use only English in all the courses so that students can
become comfortable with using the international business language at the end of the program.
However, as discussed earlier, some professors have decided to conduct their classes in Mandarin even
though the course material and student assignments concerned remain in English. Understandably,
some professors feel compelled to do that because they know the students will benefit more if they can
teach in a language that allows them to fully communicate their thoughts. However, some students feel
short-changed because they expect to have every opportunity to sharpen their language skill in the
program. "Fortunately, this happened in the second semester. Otherwise, some of us would surely have
requested to change the professor," said a student. "We struggled with English for months during the
first semester when every IMBA course was taught in English, and have become quite confident and
comfortable with using the language by the end of the semester. We therefore don't really mind if one
of our professors decide not to teach in English this term. In fact, some of us are glad to have a break."
In fact, Sloan anticipated this problem and has taken some initiatives to alleviate it. "We need English-
speaking people [who don't speak Chinese] in their classes to encourage the use of English," said
Lessard. In the past semesters, Sloan has sent lecturers and students to teach short-term courses in
China. A professor in Business Communication taught a one-week course at Tsinghua in March. Two
weeks later, a team of ten Sloan students flew halfway across the earth to teach teamwork skills to the
same group of IMBA students.
Faculty Retention
Like many American business schools, business schools in China also have to worry about losing their
faculty to the industries. The rapid growth brought about by economic reform in China has aggravated
this problem. Individuals with modern business administration and management knowledge are being
actively sought after by private firms and state-owned enterprises undergoing reform, but there are
hardly enough of them in China.
To the Chinese faculty members, the temptation to join the industries is big. Their salary scales are
fixed by the State Education Committee as part of a nationwide compensation scheme. The universities
are therefore in no position to offer better compensation to compete with the industries. In fact, most of
their students will command much higher salaries than they do on the day they graduate with their
MBA degree. In Sloan, faculty members are allowed to spend 20% of their time on outside consulting
works. In Tsinghua and Fudan, many faculty members are advisers to commercial films and state
enterprises, too, but it is not clear how much they can gain financially for such non-academic efforts.
Besides, due to the shortage of teaching resources, faculty members in Chinese universities tend to
have less time for outside engagement. In fact, they spend so much time in teaching and course
preparation that they often have very little time to pursue their research interests. This can well be an
area the respective institutions want to improve on in their efforts to retain teaching resources.
When the author discussed this issue of faculty retention with some IMBA students, they sounded less
concerned. "Many of our professors are very dedicated teachers and they enjoy teaching. That is why
they are here in the first place. Besides, they get a lot of respect from the community by teaching in a
top university like ours. Business people come to them for advises and consultation, and they can
always get some extra income from such works if they want."
3.1.7 Future Outlook
Extending the project
Although the MIT-China project was initially intended to last for five years, Alan White, the Director
of the program, is hopeful that it will be extended for at least another five years. Although the program
is well accepted by all parties involved and is producing the targeted results, raising the necessary
funds for a five-year extension "is not easy, and is always unpredictable." In order to carry its impact
further into the future, the program needs appropriate funding to train more Chinese faculty and to
develop better teaching material. That will in turn expand the capacity of the program more rapidly to
accommodate bigger MBA classes, making it a more significant source of managerial resources in
China's business community.
Extending the program will expand its scope, too. According to Philip Kwok, a third Chinese
institution, Ling Nan University in Guangdong Province in southern China, will soon become the third
Chinese institution in the program. In fact, a new business school building modeled after Tang Center
at Sloan will be constructed there soon. "With Ling Nan on board, we will have all three northern,
central and southern regions of China covered," said Kwok. "We want to eventually help each of these
three schools to become the leader in some specific fields of management research and education. For
example, with its proximity to Hong Kong, Ling Nan can focus on financial management and
operation of the service sector."
Meeting the Market Demand
The IMBA program currently trains a total of eighty MBA students per year at Tsinghua and Fudan.
Even if it expands its capacity considerably by having more teaching resources and physical facilities,
it is unlikely to produce more than a few hundred new graduates a year in the near future. "We are not
pretending that we can have much direct impact in the managerial HR market of China. The number of
managers we can produce per year is just a drop in the bucket compared to the huge demand," said
Lessard. "What we are targeting is indirect impact. We want to help Tsinghua and Fudan, which are
already top universities in China, to have the best MBA programs in the country, too. This will create a
good model for other universities to follow."
Deployment of Technology
Another way to expand the IMBA program rapidly is through the deployment of Internet and
videoconferencing technology. Such technology will allow the teaching faculty to reach a larger
audience with very little trade-off in the quality of faculty-student interaction. It will also provide an
effective channel for international exchanges at much lower cost. For example, a Sloan professor can
teach a short course at Tsinghua or Fudan through videoconferencing without having to even leave the
country. The financial and time savings in such arrangement will encourage a lot more cross-boundary
teaching than what is witnessed today. According to Dean Urban, about 400 videoconference sessions
were conducted at Sloan in 1997 alone.
"Unfortunately, the Chinese government still puts a lot of restrictions on the use of telecommunication
and Internet facilities, and that impedes our plan to introduce distant learning in China. Hopefully we
will see some deregulation in this area soon," said Thurow.
Chapter Four - Conclusion: Putting it All Together
The final chapter of this thesis summarizes the six cases studied in the last two chapters, and does
some comparisons among them. Based on the experiences and lessons found in these cases, some
recommendations are made to firms that wish to hire managers in China. Some thoughts and lessons
are also shared with those who are involved in management education in China. Lastly, the short-term
and long-term outlooks of managerial human resources in China are discussed to conclude this thesis.
4.1 Summary of Cases
This section summarizes both the supply and demand cases studied in the last two chapters by
tabulating key characteristics and issues. Weaknesses/disadvantages and strength/advantages were
highlighted by grouping them under different columns.
4.1.1 Demand-Side Summary
Summary of Human Resource Models
Summarized in the following pages are the three different managerial HR models studied in this thesis.
Please note that this is by no means a complete representation of the all the managerial HR policies
found in China. Others models may exist but these are what the author finds interesting and relevant.
Besides, the association between each model and a nationality or ethnic group only reflects a
preliminary observation on the author's part. Further research needs to be done to confirm or refute
such associations.
Table 1 - Human Resource Models
Model Strengths Weaknesses
Firm(s) Studied
The American - Good training and hi-tech - Trained managers are
Training Model image attract strong candidates susceptible to poaching
- Comprehensive reward - High training cost
Motorola China structure Obvious pay discrepancy
- Well established regional HR between local and expatriate
network that recruits and managers
deploys managers regionally
- Far-sighted localization plan
The Japanese E Low risk Difficult to identify suitable
Acquisition - Immediately productive and acquisition target
Model access to local market High acquisition cost
Kirin Beer / U Low recruitment and training Need to eliminate excess labor
President Group costs from old operation
- Good support from local
government
- Partnership with overseas
Chinese eased cultural and
language difficulties
- Extensive cultural and language
training for Japanese expatriates
Table ] - Human Resource Models (cont.)
Model Strengths Weaknesses
Firm(s) Studied
The Overseas
Chinese Model
CP Group
Chia Hsin
Gao Qiu Golf
Resort
- Exclusive use of overseas
Chinese maximize cultural and
language advantages
- Good leverage of ethnic
connections
- High costs of overseas Chinese
expatriates
- Problem-oriented, short-term
mentality of some overseas
Chinese managers
- High mobility of overseas
Chinese managers - easy
poaching target
- Ad hoc localization
- Little or no formal training in
smaller firms
- Vast experience resulted in - Factories in rural locations are
effective HR management with less attractive to candidates
good control 
- High coordination costs due to
- Large management team allows large number of sites and highly
flexible deployment local operations
- Effective training through
apprenticeship
- Employees from Taiwanese - Lack of trust for local managers
home office as a good source of
expatriate managers
Made good use of an
experienced overseas Chinese
to reengineer mismanaged
project
- Geographically far from prime
recruitment locations
- Not attractive to management
candidates due to its relatively
small size
Summary of Hiring Options
Tabulated below are all the hiring options used by the firms studied in this thesis, and their respective
advantages and disadvantages.
Table 2 - Hiring Options
Options Advantages Disadvantages
Non-Chinese - Import technology and skills 0 Language and cultural barriers
Expatriates not available locally
0Very costly due to high salary
Usually American, - Many have professional in home countries and "hardship
European or Japanese management degrees pay"
nationals; some speak
some Chinese, but most - Sometimes command better
don't respect from the locals changes overnight
Good head office relationship = Discouraged by government
(for western owners) through high taxes on benefits
Overseas Chinese -Good communication with Some lack professional training
locals due to language and in management - lack long-term
Foreign nationals of cultural similarities vision
Chinese descendent -
most read and write " Entrepreneurial spirit and vast * High mobility - easily hired
Chinese and speak one regional experience away by other firms in China or
or more Chinese Asia
dialects. Most from " Good head-office relationship
Hong Kong, Taiwan, (for overseas Chinese owners) m Discouraged by government
South East Asia and the through high taxes on benefits
United States
Chinese Nationals sFamiliar with ocal business As costly as foreign expatriates
Abroad environment - resourceful and
good local network Few have intention to return
Chinese nationals
studying or working *Well educated and understand 0 Discrepancy in compensation
abroad western business concepts may attract resentment from
locals
inGood international exposure
Table 2 - Hirin-a Options (cont.)
Other Lessons
Some other lessons not captured by the tables presented above are:
Localization appears to be a solution everyone has adopted, but the process usually takes a long
time to complete, especially for multinationals with big workforces. Bob Marsh, human-resource
director of Kodak in China, estimated that it would take at least ten years to fully localize Kodak's
management in China."
3 Alkman Granitsas, Trish Saywell, "Managing, Barely", Far Eastern Economic Review, August 28, 1997
Options Advantages Disadvantages
Local Graduates - Good local knowledge and N Very little international and
social network business exposure
Candidates from local
universities - Low cost - Some are sponsored and bonded
by SOEs
a May need additional training
- Relatively poor English
Experienced - More cost-effective than * May have bad work habits to
Managers expatriates unlearn
Local managers hired - More experienced and have - Have higher tendency to job-
from otherfirms good local business connections hop
Borrowed Managers - Low cost and no long-term * "Returning" can be difficult
obligation (if arranged
Local managers appropriately) E High search cost
transferred temporarily
form SOEs - Good for short-term * Command economy mindset
assignments
= Mindset and attitudes are more important than technical and management knowledge. Those with
the right attitude can easily be trained to manage in a short time, whereas those with the wrong
mindset usually have too much to unlearn.
= Like many other problems in China, the severity of the shortage problem depends on location. For
example, hiring managers in Beijing and Shanghai is easier than hiring in smaller cities.
- Chinese managerial candidates value training. That puts American and European firms high in the
pecking order of their career choices due to the good formal training these firms provide. Some
candidates choose managerial positions with lower salaries because they offer better training.
4.1.2 Supply-Side Summary
Following are the major lessons learned from the case study on the MIT-Chinese project:
- More than fifty top Chinese universities have been given the mission to train professional business
managers for foreign firms operating in China and local firms targeting the global market.
However, in their efforts to develop an adequate MBA curriculum and to expand their capacity,
they have to struggle with limited resources and high demand.
- Some Chinese business schools view collaboration with more-established western business
schools as a good way to expedite content development and to secure financial support. Western
universities gain from such collaborations by learning more about doing business in China in the
process. Some may also benefit financially by managing these collaborations as for-profit fund-
raising projects.
- Lack of teaching resources and course materials are the two major concerns in developing
western-style MBA programs in China.
- The "train the trainer" strategy adopted by the MIT-Chinese project is considered a better
collaborative model than the "missionary approach" since it is more likely to produce a
widespread long-term impact.
- Case studies and other course materials used in western MBA programs need to be customized to
suit the local Chinese business environment before they are used in Chinese MBA classes. Such
localization effort is time consuming and costly.
- The major challenges for the Chinese faculty teaching the IMBA program are the expectations to
use English totally and to conduct classes in the interactive format. Some instructors have done
better in these respects than others.
- To the IMBA students, lack of international exposure and not having enough career guidance are
their main concerns. Some also wish to have more opportunities to practice the use of English as a
business language.
- The IMBA students find training on business communications and team skills extremely useful.
- Some IMBA students are obliged to return to work for their SOE sponsors, but most of them will
work for foreign firms in Beijing, Shanghai or Hong Kong. Most of them expect to command a
starting salary that is five to ten times the average local pay for graduates.
4.2 Recommendations
4.2.1 Demand-side Recommendations - Hire the Trainers
It is obvious from the cases studied that most firms believe in localizing their management because
that is the most cost-effective and sustainable solution in the long run. It is also clear that, for most
strategies that are effective, the two most significant factors are hiring of overseas Chinese and heavy
emphasis on training. Training is attractive to high-potential local candidates who are eager to learn
new management skills, whereas overseas Chinese provide an experienced managerial workforce that
is most effective in managing operations in China. However, since most overseas Chinese managers
are hired on expatriate terms, they are sometimes too costly compared to local managers. Based on
these considerations, here are the author's recommendations for firms that need managers for their
Chinese operations:
- Hire overseas Chinese managers to fill senior managerial positions, but focus on hiring those who
have demonstrated talent and interest to teach. It is also desirable to hire those who are far-sighted
enough to always have the long-term benefits of the firm in mind. Make it explicit in these
managers' employment contracts that they are expected to train local managerial candidates.
= Localize aggressively by focusing recruitment efforts on hiring top graduates from local MBA
programs. Invest in marketing the firm as a managerial employer by sponsoring academic, career
development and social activities on MBA campuses.
= Study the curricula of the local MBA programs and design a training program that addresses their
weaknesses. On the other hand, use firm's influence as an employer to help local MBA programs
to tailor their contents to suit local needs and the needs of the firm.
" Justify the high cost of overseas Chinese managers by making them trainers and mentors to local
managers. Besides classroom training, provide systematic on-the-job training to local managers so
that they learn from the experiences of the overseas Chinese managers.
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- Increasingly tie overseas Chinese managers' compensations to their teaching skills and ability to
train good local managers. Gradually shift the role of overseas Chinese managers from day-to-day
management to full-time management training as local managers become more competent.
- As local managers become more experienced, train them to become trainers and gradually
eliminate the needs for expatriate managers in the long run.
One will find the strategy of "hiring the trainers" recommended above applicable to both small-size
firms and large multinationals. Smaller companies may find it most effective to have a few overseas
Chinese expatriates to provide informal on-the-job training to the locals. On the other hand, large
multinationals may have both the need and the financial strength to maintain a sizable contingent of
overseas Chinese managers. These managers are then used to identify future managers locally and to
provide regular and systematic management training to the local managerial candidates.
4.2.2 Supply-Side Recommendations - Train the Trainers
Based on the observed needs in the currents managerial job market and the shortcomings of the
existing local MBA programs, here are some recommendations for the organizations and individuals
who wish to contribute to management education in China:
- Focus efforts on expanding the current teaching resources. Adopt the "train the trainers" strategy
used by the MIT-China project to maximize long-term impact of today's investment.
- Provide financial, professional and in-kind resources to develop teaching material that integrates
state-of-the-art global management theories and local business environment.
- Work closely with both foreign and local firms in China that would ultimately decide whether the
education system is supplying them with the right managers. Besides making these firms a good
resource for financial support, MBA programs should also solicit to share their knowledge and
experiences by inviting them to present at industrial seminars and making them targets for case
studies.
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- Students from business management programs in China should be given more international
exposure so that they become confident enough to manage globally after their graduation from
business schools. Besides having teaching material with western business theories and global
contents, this can be helped achieve by admitting students with foreign backgrounds (e.g. foreign
students from other Asian countries), having guest lecturers from abroad, providing international
internship to students, organizing international student trips, etc.
- Provide financial support by raising educational funds from firms and organizations that have
direct and indirect interests in the managerial job market in China. Efforts must be made to make
sure the funds raised are properly managed and used most effectively to fulfill their respective
management education objectives. A large portion of such funds should be spent on developing
teaching resources as long-term investments in management education.
- Make use of modern communication and information technologies to address the critical shortage
of teaching resources and learning material. Internet technology, for example, can be used
effectively to tap into global resources that are otherwise too expensive to obtain.
- Those with management knowledge and industrial experiences should be given the appropriate
incentives to participate in educating future managers. Besides offering competitive monetary
benefits and social status to part-time and full-time teaching staff, continuous training should also
be provided to the trainers so that they always stay in the forefront of management education and
be informed of the latest development in the global business arena. Knowledgeable, inspiring and
aptly rewarded teachers will in turn encourage more management students to join the teaching
force later.
The recommendations above focus on the development of appropriate teaching resources for
management education in China. The problem of supply shortage can only be solved when enough
properly trained trainers are available to train future managers in the long run.
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4.3 Future Outlook
"It takes ten years to grow a tree, but educating the people takes a hundred years to bear fruits."
- Chinese Proverb
The critical shortage of management talent will continue to haunt both local and foreign businesses in
China. While firms are doing all they can to overcome and preempt the shortage from the demand side,
much is also being done to improve and expand business and management education in China so that
the supply capacity for new managers will continue to grow. Although it takes only twenty months to
train an MBA student, it takes much longer to develop a good MBA program. Changing the mindset
and attitude of the entire population of China will probably take decades. Looking forward, here are
some of my hopeful and optimistic predictions.
4.2.1 Short-Term Outlook
An article published by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) in Switzerland
had the following to say about managers from China:
"There is a new generation of well-educated, cosmopolitan Chinese professionals, who are
amazingly at ease with the world of global commerce. Beyond their intellect and confidence,
which is breathtaking to those who have long written about the inadequacies of Chinese
management, what is so striking about this new generation of Chinese managers is that they
have little, if any, allegiance to the state sector. They like what they see of the multinational
corporate world, what it offers in terms of compensation and development, and they are
easily able to talk about building careers inside China, and abroad, with any number of
foreign firms." 36
36 William A. Fischer & Dominique Turpin, "Foreign Companies' Performance in China: An assessment at the
start of the post-Deng era", May 1997 (http://www.imd.ch/pub/pfm_9705.html)
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While the above description is indeed consistent with what the author has observed in the past three
to four years, China is still far from solving its problem of shortage and inadequacy on the
managerial HR front. First of all, demand still far exceeds supply for the elite managers described
above. As discussed earlier, the large supply-demand gap caused by the socialist legacy and rapid
economic growth will take many years to close given the rate at which professional managers are
being trained in China. Furthermore, narrowing the gap is only possible if managers can be trained
at a faster rate than the rate at which demand grows. Although China has taken steps to develop and
expand its national management education, much still need to be done before both the quality and
quantity on the supply side of the managerial HR market can be considered adequate.
Secondly, many of the business-savvy managers described in the IMD article may well become part
of the management workforce of another country, and will therefore not contribute to alleviating the
shortage. As long as business and living conditions in China remain relatively backwards compared
to other countries where Chinese managers are in demand, these managers will not return to manage
businesses in China.
On the other hand, the expected economic downturn in the next few years resulting from the recent
Asia economic crisis will help to consolidate the managerial job market in China. Demand for
managers in both China and the entire Asia region is expected to decline considerably as national
economies try to recover and businesses consolidate and reorganize. Both foreign and local firms in
China should use this opportunity to reassess their HR policies and speed up their localization
process. They should recruit aggressively but selectively to build up the size and quality of the local
managerial workforce. They should also invest in comprehensive and systematic in-house
management training for the next two to three years, since the opportunity cost of doing so will be
low during a slow economy. A team of local managers trained and deployed throughout the
organization during this period of time will become a real asset to a firm when the economy moves
on to the next cycle of growth.
Businesses concerned should also pay close attention to the current efforts by the government to
restructure state-owned enterprises. In their efforts to streamline operations, and despite the
expectation that hundreds of thousands of state employees will lose their jobs during the mandated
reform, the SOEs may in fact create a great demand for professional managers. A new generation of
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managers is direly needed to help manage organizational and operational changes during the process
to reform and reorganize the SOEs. In fact, some SOEs' are already aware of their needs to be
globally competitive and professional managed. This is evident from the fact that many of the
students in the MBA programs today are sponsored by SOEs.
4.2.2 Long-term Outlook
As China upgrades its economy and moves upmarket to develop more management-intensive
industries, continuing to rely on expatriate managers to manage its enterprises is not a sustainable
human resource strategy. The high cost of doing so will undermine competitiveness at both the country
and the firm level. The only long-term solution is therefore to aggressively develop and expand
management education in the country to ensure an adequate supply of local management talent in the
future.
The needs of those with strong desire to learn how to manage professionally will continue to drive the
market of management education. The quantity of management education programs will increase and
their capacity will expand as modern teaching tools such as videoconferencing and distant learning
facilities enter the scene. High quality content and teaching resources will also be developed to meet
international standard as China further globalizes its economy.
Well-respected Chinese scientists and engineers have long been prominent members of the
international research and technical workforces. It is the author's hope that an adequate management
education system will soon be able to train managers in China to combine the strength of their local
knowledge and their global reach, thereby allowing them to become part of the global pool of
management talent in the not-too-distant future.
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Appendix 1 - A Message from Zhu Rongji
"In order to develop a socialism with Chinese characteristics, we need a large pool of economics and
management talent. They know the basic principles of market economy, are familiar with its operation,
and at the same time have a good understanding of Chinese enterprises. We should have the courage
to introduce the contents, methodologies and tactics from all the top-notch business schools in the
world, learn from them, and incorporate them with the unique environment of China. That will allow
the Economics and Management School of Tsinghua University to develop into a world-class business
school. I would like to share this inspiration with my colleagues."
ZHU Rongji, February 22, 1994
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